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The American people are suffering from what can be called "a syndrome
of paranoia and neglect" about potential dangers to their health, safety,
and the environment. This leads to a paradox that is becoming increas
ingly recognized. Large amounts of resources are devoted to slight or
speculative dangers while substantial and well-documented dangers re
main unaddressed.

1

-John Graham

The last third of the twentieth century is not too late a time for turning
the rule of law and the non-delegation doctrine into effective and useful
legal tools for minimizing injustice from improper discretionary power.
-Kenneth Culp

I.

Davis2

INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

This Article deals with two linked questions. The first involves the
future of the Clean Air Act.3 The particular concern is how the Envi
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") might be .encouraged, with
help from reviewing courts, to issue better ambient air quality stan
dards, and in the process to shift from some of the anachronisms of
1970s environmentalism to a more fruitful approach to environmental
protection. The second question involves the role of the nondelega
tion doctrine in American public law, a doctrine that shows unmistak
able signs of revival. I will suggest that improved performance by
EPA and agencies in general, operating in tandem with a new ap
proach to judicial review, would make it altogether unnecessary to re
vive the nondelegation doctrine. Indeed, the nondelegation doctrine
would emerge as a crude and unhelpful response to existing problems
in modem regulation, even a form of judicial usurpation. Far better
responses are available.
A.

Basic Proposals and First Principles

In issuing and revising a national ambient air quality regulation
under the Clean Air Act, EPA should provide a detailed "benefits
analysis." To this end, it should undertake two tasks. First, it should

1. John D. Graham, Making Sense ofRisk: An Agenda for Congress, in RISKS, COSTS,
AND LIVES SAVED: GETIING BETTER REsULTS FROM REGULATION 183, 183 (Robert w.
Hahn ed., 1996).

2. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
(1969).
3. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).

A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

51
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specify the range of benefits that it believes are likely to result from
the regulation, along with a specification of the range of benefits that
it believes would result from at least two reasonable alternative ap
proaches, one stricter and one more lenient. In the process EPA
should identify the residual risk left under the competing regulatory
regimes; it should also acknowledge scientific uncertainty, to the ex
tent that uncertainty exists and requires guesswork. This proposal is
an effort to strengthen the role of sound science in environmental pro
tection.
Second, EPA should explain why it believes that the chosen rule is
preferable to the less and more stringent alternatives - why the set of
benefits to be received from the selected rule justify that rule, whereas
the set of benefits to be received from the less and more stringent
rules do not. In the process it should explain why the residual risk left
by the selected rule is acceptable, while the residual risk left by the
less stringent rule is not. This proposal is an effort to strengthen the
role of democratic forces in environmental protection.4
If necessary, reviewing courts should require EPA to perform
these tasks. Taken together, the two proposals should increase the
level of consistency across regulations, reduce the power of well
organized· private groups, and diminish the risks associated with both
insufficient and excessive environmental regulation. If EPA has un
dertaken the two tasks, and carried them out in a reasonable way, ju
dicial review is at an end; courts should uphold EPA's decision.
Ideas of this kind have potentially broad implications, extending
well beyond the Clean Air Act and even EPA, to the work of the Oc
cupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), the Con
sumer Product Safety Commission, and the National Highway Traffic
and Safety Administration as well. They would mark a key moment in
the movement toward a system of environmental protection that is at
once more democratic and better informed. At the same time, they
would accelerate the continuing shift from 1970s environmentalism
and indeed 1970s regulation in general, away from recognizing the ex
istence of problems of safety and health and toward assessing their
magnitude, in such a way as to reduce both regulatory paranoia and
regulatory neglect, and to put a premium on the acquisition of infor
mation.5

4. Of course costs are important too; the two proposals are based on the current under
standing that benefits, but not costs, may be taken into account in issuing primary standards.
The question of costs is taken up later. See infra Section VI.C.
5. For general discussion in this vein, see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION {1993), and NEIL GUNNINGHAM &
PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998).
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If agencies undertook tasks of this kind, there would be little point
to the recent resurgence of interest in the nondelegation doctrine.
The sensible impulses that underlie that interest - impulses that in
volve accountability, deliberation, and sound policymaking - can be
handled through other means, a point that casts a more general light
on the proper role of the nondelegation doctrine in American public
law. I suggest that the proper role of that doctrine consists in statutory
construction that imposes floors and ceilings on agency action, and in
a set of "nondelegation canons" that prevent agencies from acting
without clear congressional authorization. Taken together, judicial
requirements of this kind would constitute a form of "democracy
promoting minimalism"6 in the distinctive context of administrative
law - and a partial step toward a better and more sophisticated ap
proach to environmental protection. These are the basic claims that I
will attempt to defend in this Article.
B.

The Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Act may well be the most important of all environ
mental statutes. Its effects include a wide range of beneficial conse
quences for human health and well-being and high costs on the private
sector. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates overall com
pliance costs at $0.5 trillion.7 The Act's claim to success rests on
enormous improvements in ambient air quality and corresponding
health benefits. EPA estimates that the Act prevents at least 45,000
deaths annually and that it also prevents a minimum of 13,000 heart
attacks and 7,000 annual strokes.8 On a standard (though not undis
puted) view, the benefits of the Act, ranging between $5.6 trillion and
$49.4 trillion, far exceed its costs.9

6. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT {1999), on the general topic of judicial minimalism.

7. See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAzuREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 130 {1998).
8. See id. Judgments about benefits, nonmonetized but especially monetized, are highly
sensitive to contentious assumptions, and hence the "bottom line" numbers should be taken
with many grains of salt. See RANDALL LUTIER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF THE EPA's
BENEFIT EsTIMATES IN OMB's DRAFT REPORT ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
REGULATION {1998) (urging the use of plausible alternative assumptions and asserting that
EPA's benefit calculations are inflated); see also Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of
Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE LJ. 1981 {1998) (urging that costs per lives saved are inflated,
also because of contentious assumptions). Though coming from different directions, Lutter
and Heinzerling both argue, convincingly, that characterization of both benefits and costs
can shift dramatically with small changes in assumptions, an argument that much bears on
the central claims of this Article. See Randall Lutter & Christopher DeMuth, Ozone and the
Constitution at the EPA, ON THE ISSUES, July 1999, at 3.
9. See DAVIES & MAzUREK, supra note 7, at 130, 147.
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The Act has nonetheless been subject to telling criticism. The
foundation of clear air regulation consists of EPA's issuance of na
tionally uniform ambient air quality standards;10 but in light of the ex
traordinary diversity of the fifty states, it is not clear that the idea of
national standards can be rationally defended.11 In addition, both
lower courts and EPA seem to think that the standard-setting process
does not and cannot involve consideration of costs.12 But does it make
sense, or is it even feasible, to say that national standards will be
founded on an assessment of benefits alone, conducted in a cost vac
uum?13 If an improvement in ambient air quality would produce
health benefits that are small but not trivial, isn't it clear that the im
provement is justified if compliance costs are trivial, but not if the
costs are extremely high? There is reason to think that at least in
some cases, an understanding of costs has affected EPA's decision
about appropriate standards - but that the cost-benefit balancing has
been left implicit and free from public scrutiny and review.14
Perhaps the largest question involves the criteria by which EPA
decides whether one or another level of regulation is (in the statutory
phrase) "requisite to protect the public health."15 For most pollutants,
air quality at various levels is not either "safe" or "not safe"; there are
diminishing degrees of risk associated with diminishing degrees of ex
posure. On what basis is a particular level of residual risk said to be
the appropriate one? What judgments do, or should, enter into that
conclusion? EPA has been criticized for sometimes suggesting, in an
unhelpful and conclusory fashion, that it chooses the "safe" level, as if
this were solely a technocratic judgment and as if "safety" were an on
off switch,16 when its decision about permissible levels rests instead on
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1994).
11. See James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and
Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974). For an instructive recent discussion of how
the "slippage" between law on the books and law in the world actually allows a degree of
flexibility, and converts seemingly rigid standards into a basis for negotiation and
pragmatism, see Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999).
12. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F3d 1027, 1040-41 (D.C. Cir.1999) (per
curiam); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-56 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
13. See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., lliE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 49-82, 282-84 (1994) (examin
ing EPA's 1979 effort to revise the air quality standards for ozone and the Bush administra
tion's attempt to win the support of the Science Advisory Board).
14. See id.; C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Reform, 11 TuL.
ENVTL. L.J. 235, 235 (1998).
15. 42 u.s.c. § 7409(b )(1).
16. See LANDY ET AL., supra note 13, at 282-84. The criticism is not sound as applied to
the particulates and ozone regulations, where EPA noted diminishing risk with diminishing
exposure levels; but here too, EPA's explanation leaves many open questions.
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a series of political, scientific, and economic judgments and compro
mises.
There are two problems with this state of affairs. The first involves
democratic deliberation.17 If EPA does not give a clear sense of the
range of adverse effects, and if it does not say why one set of such ef
fects calls for regulation and another does not, the public and its rep
resentatives are not informed of the nature of the underlying ques
tions, and they are unable to evaluate the choices actually made.
Under EPA's articulated position, a purely technical issue (would a
certain level be safe?) is sometimes substituted, at least publicly, for
the real and more complicated ones (what level of safety is appropri
ate in light of all the relevant factors? why should one level of regula
tion be preferred to another?).
The second problem involves sound regulatory policy. Any pro
posed national standard could be loosened or tightened, and the ques
tion is whether the agency has chosen the optimal, or at least a rea
sonable, regulatory "point." Without a clear and (to the extent
possible) quantified presentation of the expected environmental bene
fits of the various altematives,18 there can be no assurance that the
agency has chosen that point, rather than one that is too strict or too
lenient.
C.

ARemarkable Decision and a New Doctrine

In its extraordinary decision in American Trucking Ass'ns v.
EPA,19 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum
bia Circuit responded to this last concern in the strongest possible
terms. It held that as interpreted by EPA, the key provisions of the
Clean Air Act - those that give EPA authority to issue national air
quality standards - represent an unconstitutional delegation of legis
lative power.20 The decision announces the birth of a new nondelega
tion doctrine, one with potentially large implications for regulatory
policy. Under the new doctrine, open-ended statutory terms will be
invalidated unless agencies are able to specify the governing legal cri
teria - to discipline their own authority through narrowing interpre
tations.

17. See id.
18. Costs are of course important too. As discussed below, the prevailing view forbids
EPA from considering costs, and my basic proposal does not challenge that prevailing view.
I do, however, raise some doubts about it below. See infra Section VI.C.
19. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rehearing en bane denied, Nos. 97-1440,
97-1441, 1999 WL 979463 (D.C. Cir. Oct 29, 1999).
20. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033.
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The new nondelegation doctrine is remarkable for many reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has not used the doctrine to invalidate a fed
eral statute since (or for that matter before) 1935,21 and hence any
such decision by a court of appeals is reasonably taken to mark a fresh
departure. Second, the new doctrine does not require Congress to
legislate with clarity. It says instead that if Congress has not been
clear, agencies must act on their own, to set out limits on their own le
gal authority. Third, there now appears to be a genuine doctrine in
place; American Trucking represents no isolated decision, but the
culmination of a line of lower court cases, one of which was a similar
decision about the Occupational Safety and Health Act.22 The deci
sion therefore signals a distinctive approach to judicial review of
agency action. Fourth, the doctrine is conspicuously responsive to
what the court of appeals saw (and often sees) as a general problem in
federal regulation: the difficulty of knowing why an agency chooses
one level of regulation rather than another that is somewhat higher or
somewhat lower.
The new doctrine raises a number of questions. The narrowest
(though far from unimportant) issue has to do with the fate of EPA
rulemaking with respect to national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS"). What, if anything, can EPA do in the future? The ques
tion is significant both because of its consequences for implementation
of the Clean Air Act and because of its implications for regulatory
policy in general. On its face, the American Trucking decision would
seem to draw into serious constitutional question not only EPA's
ozone and particulates regulations, but also a wide range of other
regulations by EPA, and indeed a wide range of decisions by many
other agencies involved in the protection of health and welfare (and
other areas as well; consider the Federal Communications Commis
sion). And what, exactly, is the relationship between the new doctrine
and ordinary judicial review to test whether agency action has been
"arbitrary" or "capricious"? An especially large question, and the
central focus here, has to do with how American Trucking exposes
continuing problems with the design and implementation of environ
mental regulation as a whole and the Clean Air Act in particular, a
statute whose key provisions seem to depend on implausible assump
tions, and under which EPA has sometimes hidden crucial questions
of value with uninformative platitudes.

21. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

v.

United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama

22. See International Union v. OSHA, 938 F.3d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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D. Goals and Plans
In this Article, my most general goal is to understand current diffi
culties with environmental policy, the Clean Air Act, and EPA prom
ulgation of ambient air quality standards, and to see how EPA and
courts might perform a constructive role in making things better
rather than worse. My simplest claim is that EPA should undertake
the two tasks identified above; it should specify the range of benefits
that it believes will follow from the regulation it seeks to impose, in
cluding a discussion of the benefits from more lenient and more strin
gent alternatives and a treatment of the residual risks under the vari
ous regulatory regimes. It should also explain why it believes that the
chosen regulation is preferable to the alternatives.
Steps in these directions would satisfy the legitimate concerns of
most critics of EPA's performance under the Clean Air Act and also
of the court of appeals in American Trucking. Such steps also have
broad applicability and would represent a new departure of their own
in administrative law, covering the activities of EPA under a wide
range of statutes and also the activities of (for example) the Occupa
tional Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Admini
stration. Steps of this sort would not amount to a nondelegation doc
trine, new or old. But they are designed to promote both rule-of-law
values and sound regulatory policy, in a way that should respond to
growing understandings about current problems in environmental
policy and the administrative state.
I have three more particular goals. The first is to reject the non
delegation doctrine, both old and new, as a way of ensuring better and
more transparent policy analysis by EPA and other agencies. That is
sue raises large questions about democratic accountability and about
the appropriate role of courts in reviewing agency action. I suggest
that although the new doctrine has considerable appeal, this is not
really a nondelegation doctrine at all, and the relevant goals would be
better accomplished through a form of more conventional (but better
informed) judicial review of agency action. The Clean Air Act is
hardly unconstitutional, for it is possible to generate an interpretation
of the Act that imposes both "floors" and "ceilings" on agency action.
My second goal is to propose a contemporary role for the nondele
gation doctrine in American public law. I claim that the doctrine is
properly held in reserve for extreme cases - that it serves as a genu
ine, but judicially underenforced, constitutional norm - and that it
operates as a legitimate tool of statutory construction. More impor
tantly, I contend that the doctrine is not so much dead as relocated.
Its current home can be found not in cases invalidating open-ended
grants of authority, but in the many decisions using various "clear
statement" principles to discipline legislative and administrative ac-
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tion.23 When courts require Congress to speak clearly in order to
authorize an agency to raise a serious constitutional problem, or to
apply a statute extraterritorially or retroactively, they are applying a
narrower and more targeted version of the nondelegation doctrine a version that requires Congress to focus, with particularity, on certain
especially sensitive questions. By requiring congressional rather than
merely executive deliberation on those questions, the various "clear
statement" principles operate as a nondelegation doctrine in another
guise. As such, the principles are easily defended, for they promote
the key functions of the nondelegation doctrine without carrying the
risks of the old and new versions.
My third goal is to discuss possible improvements in the operation
of the Clean Air Act, at the legislative, administrative, and judicial
levels, improvements that might respond to various concerns about
EPA performance, including the concerns expressed in American
Trucking. I attempt to explain how the Act seems based on the (false)
assumption that pollutants generally have "safe thresholds," and how
this assumption has seriously impaired both regulatory policymaking
and democratic deliberation. I also suggest that the Act should be in
terpreted, or if necessary amended, to allow and require EPA to en
gage in "health-health tradeoffs" - and also to take account of costs
in setting national standards. In particular, I emphasize that EPA
should engage in more specific and quantitative assessments of the
hazardous effects of pollution at various levels, so as to increase the
transparency of its decisions. It could even make sense for EPA to
move in the direction of the "quality-adjusted life years" approach,
designed to provide a concrete sense of the benefits of regulatory al
ternatives.24 Under such an approach, EPA would attempt to specify
the range of "quality-adjusted life years" likely to be saved by a regu
lation, and it would also indicate the degree of savings that would jus
tify a regulation. But because of the harmful side effects of aggressive
judicial review, courts should play only a secondary and catalytic role
- embodied in certain recent and quite innovative procedural devel
opments in administrative law, above all the "remand without invali
dation." As we will see, this procedural route is administrative law's
newest species of minimalism, indeed a form of democracy-promoting
minimalism.25 The central point is that EPA should undertake such
inquiries on its own.
23. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000),
for a catalogue. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992)
(discussing clear statement principles in general).

24. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1039-40 & n.5.
For a general discussion of judicial minimalism, see SUNS1EIN, supra note 6.

25.
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This Article comes in six parts. Part II deals with the Clean Air
Act and in particular with the artificiality of the inquiries that it ap
pears to make central to EPA's task. Part ill explores the old non
delegation doctrine, the development of the new nondelegation doc
trine, and the use of the doctrine in American Trucking and related
cases. Part IV evaluates the new doctrine, explains why the Clean Air
Act is constitutionally unproblematic, and suggests an alternative ap
proach. Part V discusses the proper approaches to the Act from Con
gress, EPA, and reviewing courts. Part VI is a brief conclusion.

II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Overall, the benefits of the Clean Air Act since its enactment in 1970
clearly outweigh the costs.
-J. Clarence Davies and Jan Mazurek:26

Congress should not preclude decisionmakers from considering the eco
nomic costs and benefits of different policies in the development of
regulations.

-Kenneth Arrow et al.27

Most environmental initiatives of the past seemed expensive and ques
tionable at the time, and today every one of them appears a bargain in
retrospect. Looking back on the present a few decades hence, society
will consider every environmental program running now to have been a
bargain, and wish more programs had been started sooner.

-Gregg Easterbrook28

A.

Setting National Standards
1.

The Key Provisions

The Clean Air Act was enacted in 1970. Though many hundreds
of pages in length, some of them mind-numbingly specific and de
tailed,29 the Act offers two remarkably brief provisions designed to set
the statutory program in motion.

26. DAVIES & MAzUREK, supra note 7, at 147.
27. KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL,
HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 6 (1996).
28. GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTII:
ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM 210 (1995).

THE COMING AGE OF

29. Consider the acid deposition program, which goes so far as to list, by name, every
plant entitled to emit sulfur dioxide and its permitted emissions level (a flavor: 13,570 tons
for the Colbert plant, generator number one, in Alabama; 15,430 tons for the Armstrong
plant, generator number two, in Pennsylvania), see Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(c)
(1994), alongside an exceptionally specific program for the granting and trading of emissions
rights, see 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b).
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The first of these provisions, and the central focus here, involves
national primary ambient air quality standards.30 Here EPA is asked
to set standards "the attainment and maintenance of which in the
judgment of the Administrator," based on air quality criteria docu
ments "and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to
protect the public health. "31 The second of these provisions involves
national secondary ambient air quality standards, which EPA must set
at levels "requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or
anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air
pollutant in the ambient air."32 "Welfare" is defined to include "ef
fects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals,
wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration
of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on eco
nomic values and on personal comfort and well-being . . . . "33 For sec
ondary standards, involving welfare rather than health, there is no
provision for an "adequate margin of safety." But the secondary stan
dards are anticipated to be more stringent than the primary ones; no
tice in particular the statutory emphasis on plant and animal life.
These provisions have three especially noteworthy features. First,
they seem at first glance not to contemplate any consideration of cost
in the standard-setting process.34 Primary standards are based on
health, apparently to be assessed in a cost vacuum, while secondary
standards are based on welfare, also apparently to be assessed without
regard to cost. This is not at all an inevitable reading of the relevant
provisions; perhaps the level "requisite to protect the public health"
and "welfare" is a function of cost, not only benefit; but the prevailing
interpretation is otherwise.35 Second, the standards are fully national
- even though political judgments about air quality vary greatly from
state to state, and even though the effects of improved air quality (on
the cost and benefit sides) are highly variable from one state to an
other. Finally, both provisions appear to contemplate the existence of
"safe thresholds." The basic idea is that EPA should ensure that air is
"safe" and that public welfare is "protected."
What makes this last idea distinctive is its artificiality. To be sure,
we could imagine pollutants for which the evidence indicated a point

30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)-(b).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(l) (emphasis added).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (emphasis added).
33. 42 u.s.c. § 7602(h).
34. American Trucking confirms this reading. See 175 F.3d 1027, 104041 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (per curiam). For the initial holding to this effect, see Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647
F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
35. See Lead Indus., 647 F.2d at 1148-56.
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of "no risk" or "de minimis risk." At least in theory,'it is possible to
construct a dose-response curve for which risks effectively vanish at a
certain defined point. But for most pollutants, there are diminishing
degrees of risk, associated with diminishing degrees of pollution.36
"Safety" is not an off-on switch; it is a matter of degree. When it is
said that a certain level of pollution is "safe," what is really meant is
that the residual risk is acceptable or tolerable - not that there is no
risk at all. Consider, for example, this commendably direct testimony
from the Chair of EPA's Scientific Advisory Committee's panel on
ozone and particulates, unambiguously confessing the impossible na
ture of the task imposed on EPA by the Act:

Based on information now available, it appears that ozone may elicit a
continuum of biological responses down to background concentrations.
It is critical to understand that a biological response does not necessarily
imply an adverse health effect. Nevertheless, this means that the para
digm of selecting a standard at the lowest-observable-effects-level and
then providing an '"adequate margin of safety"' is not possible. It fur
ther means that risk assessments must play a central role in identifying an
appropriate level.37
How might we explain the enactment of provisions that seem at
once so vague, rigid, and artificial? Much of the answer lies in the dis
tinctive political dynamic of environmental debates in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, in which citizens wanted air to be "safe" and politi
cians who failed to respond were at great risk.38 We might even de
scribe the result as "1970s environmentalism," a form of thinking that
accomplished a great deal of good, by producing rapid decreases in
pollution levels, but that also seems increasingly anachronistic, even
counterproductive. In the 1970s in particular, politicians would pro
ceed at their peril if they asserted that "safety" could be compromised
by other goals.39 At the same time, politicians were affected by, and
doubtless catered to, the pervasive psychological urge for certainty, as
confirmed by evidence that people are willing to pay a great deal for
"no risk" and much less for "substantially less risk."40 Thus, for exam-

36. See, e.g., LANDY ET AL., supra note 13, at 55-56, 78-79.
37. EPA's Rulemakings on the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter and Ozone: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1997) (prepared statement of George T.
Woolf, Former Chairman, EPA's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee).
38. See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory ofStatutory Evolution: The Federali
zation ofEnvironmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & 0RG. 313, 333-38 (1985) (describing a "Politi
cians' Dilemma" that forced lawmakers to pass more stringent statutes than they originally
wanted).
39. See, e.g., id. at 336.
40. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); George Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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ple, people are willing to pay more for a reduction of a risk from 0.1 to
0.0 than from 0.3 to 0.1.41 The idea that the Clean Air Act would pro
duce "safety" rather than "reduced risk" made it far easier to support
and far harder to challenge.
Undoubtedly Congress believed that it was delegating to EPA the
power to be reasonable rather than unreasonable, and in any case the
Act allowed various safeguards in the event that compliance proved to
be excessively costly.42 The most important safeguard has consisted in
a form of (implicitly authorized) civil disobedience on the part of all
relevant actors, including EPA. The result has been a complex pro
gram for nonattainment areas43 and a number of illuminating episodes;
thus EPA was simply not prepared to shut down automobile traffic in
Los Angeles, a step that would have been necessary to produce com
pliance with national air quality standards.44
2.

Problems and Puzzles

All of these points have created serious difficulties for EPA in
practice. The first problem has to do with expense. For nonthreshold
pollutants,45 it seems both natural and sensible to assess further reduc
tions in terms of their cost. H, for example, the expense of reducing
sulfur dioxide from 0.3 ppm to 0.2 ppm is trivial, then the reduction is
almost certainly worthwhile (unless the dose-response curve has a
most peculiar shape46). Even if there is little direct evidence of ad
verse human health effects at 0.2 ppm, this is likely to be because of
the limited data, rather than because of an absence of such effects.
But matters look very different if the cost would run into the tens of
billions of dollars. When benefits are highly uncertain, it is peculiar to
say that EPA cannot consider cost, especially since health gains are
almost inevitable as permissible exposure levels decline.47

41. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 40, at 268-69.
42. For an outline, see Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266-69 (1976).
43. See Oean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-15 (1994).
44. See Krier, supra note 11, at 335-41 (describing EPA's abandonment of a 1973 plan to
ration gasoline in the Los Angeles area).
45. These are pollutants that have some possibility of some adverse health impact at any
exposure level above zero.
46. For example, one that would show no health benefits from a reduction from 0.3 ppm
to 0.2 ppm, notwithstanding health benefits from a reduction from 0.4 ppm to 03 ppm.
47. As noted below, it seems that cost considerations were relevant to EPA's decision
not to reduce the particulates standard further than it did, since some data indicated possibly
significant benefits from further reductions. See infra app. tbl.11.
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In light of this point, some critics have suggested that some kind of
cost-benefit balancing inevitably occurs at EPA.48 At least publicly,
BPA denies this claim.49 Consider Administrator Browner's sugges
tion:
Costs of meeting the standards and related factors have never been con
sidered in setting the national ambient air quality standards themselves
. . . . [T]he focus has been entirely on health, risk, exposure and damage
to the environment . . . . And the American public deserves to know
whether the air in its cities and counties is unsafe or not; that question
should never be confused with the separate issues of how long it may
take or how much it may cost to reduce pollution to safe levels. Indeed,
to allow costs and related factors to influence the determination of what
levels protect public health would be to mislead the American public in a
very fundamental way.50
Only insiders know for certain whether EPA does in fact consider
costs in issuing national ambient air quality standards.51 But consider,
by way of contrast and as a possible clue, the Administrator's explana
tion of the 1979 revision of the ozone standard:

The Clean Air Act, as the Administrator interprets it, does not permit
him to take factors such as cost of attainment or attainability into ac
count in setting the level of the standard; the standard is to be one that
will adequately protect public health .... [He] recognizes ...that con
trolling CO to very low levels is a task that can have significant impact on
economic and social activity. This recognition causes [him] to reject as
an option the setting of a zero-level standard . ... However, it is public
health, and not economic impact, that must be the compelling factor in
the decision.52

48. See, e.g., George Eads, The Confusion ofGoals and Instruments: The Explicit Con
sideration of Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in To BREATIIE
FREELY: RISK, CONSENT, AND AIR 223, 227-29 (Mary Gibson ed., 1985). See also the sug
gestion in Farber, supra note 11, at 315-18, about the distinctive "slippage" between law and
reality in the context of environmental law.
49. See Carbon Monoxide: Proposed Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards and Announcement of Public Meetings, 45 Fed. Reg. 55,066 (1980) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R pt. 50).
50. Clean Air Act: Ozone and Particulate Matter Standards: Hearings Before the Sub
comm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety of the Senate Env't and
Pub. Works Comm., 105th Cong. 282 (1997) [hereinafter Clean Air Hearings] (statement of
Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA).
51. As noted, EPA's failure to require more stringent regulation of particulates provides
some evidence of cost consideration. On EPA's own numbers, more stringent regulation
might have provided $4 billion in increased benefits. See infra app. tbl.11. If these benefits
were possible, why did EPA not require greater stringency, if not because of some cost con
sciousness?
52. Carbon Monoxide: Proposed Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Stan
dards and Announcement of Public Meetings, 45 Fed. Reg. at 55,072.
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This explanation, difficult to follow though it is, is most naturally
taken as a suggestion that despite the nominal irrelevance of cost,
costs do matter in the context of standard-setting for nonthreshold
pollutants.
The second problem has to do with federalism. The Act requires
uniform national standards; but in practice, EPA authorizes a consid
erable amount of variation among states. For example, there is little
question that the exceedingly high costs of attainment will, for many
states, produce frequent violations of national requirements - and
this has in fact turned out to be the case.s3 Several decades after the
initial issuance of ambient air quality standards for ozone, for exam
ple, over 50 million people live in areas that are frequently in violation
of national standards.54 Smaller numbers - but still many millions of people live in nonattainment areas for other pollutants.ss
The upshot is that national standards have mostly served not as
real law, but as targets or aspirations56
flexible goals to which the
federal government can point without, however, insisting on compli
ance unless or until it is reasonable. This aspirational quality of na
tional standards has led Congress to enact an increasingly complex set
of provisions for nonattainment areas, provisions that anticipate com
pliance in certain areas over a period of many years and that, in prac
tice, therefore recognize the existence of reasonable variations across
states.s7 Indeed it is contemplated, by the 1990 revision of the Act,
that one of the nation's largest urban areas, Los Angeles, will not be in
compliance until 2010 at the earliest.ss
This point leads to a more general one, bearing on cost-benefit
balancing as well as on federalism. EPA's official position that
standard-setting is cost-blind is complemented by explicit statements
to the effect that cost, efficiency, and feasibility are relevant in making
-

53. See, e.g., Eads, supra note 48, at 1228-35; John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism
Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995); Farber, supra note 11, at 303-04;
James Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226 (1995); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Rich
ard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational
Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978).
54. See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAzUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION: DOES THE
U.S. SYSTEM WORK? 17 fig.l (1997).
55. See id. (showing that about nine million people live in areas not meeting national
standards for particulates, about eleven million live in areas not meeting national standards
for carbon monoxide, and about five million live in areas not meeting standards for lead).
45.

56. See Eads, supra note 48, at 226; Henderson & Pearson, supra note 53, at 1429, 1442-

57. The Clean Air Act, 42 §§ 7401-7671q (1994), contains these nonattainment provi
sions at 42 U.S.C.§§ 7501-15, especially at§ 7511.
58. See 42 U.S.C.§ 7511.
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choices about compliance.59 In a way these statements are puzzling,
for the Supreme Court has held that cost, and infeasibility, are
irrelevant to EPA's decision whether to approve state implementation
plans.(j() But EPA appears to acknowledge that state implementation
plans will themselves consider costs, and also that cost will be relevant
in setting schedules for compliance.61
Finally, EPA must make hard choices about how safe is safe
enough, an important question in light of the artificiality of the idea
that air is either "safe" or "unsafe." EPA's choices involve not merely
the facts, but also evaluative judgments about acceptable degrees of
risk. A central question has to do with the ingredients of any judg
ment that a certain risk is too high. There are many important ques
tions here, which include:62
• The size of the population at risk, that is, whether 100,000, a mil
lion, or tens of millions of people are at risk.63
• The nature of the population at risk - for example, whether it
involves a large number of children, whether only elderly people
are affected, whether those affected have a preexisting condition,
such as asthma.64 An important question is whether any "lives
saved" number would involve young people or old people; there
is less need for a policy that would (say) increase life expectancy
by one year for those over 80 than for a policy that would in
crease life expectancy by sixty years for those under 10. This
point suggests that EPA might reasonably concern itself not with
lives saved, but with life-years saved, a point to which I will re
turn.65
• The likelihood of harm for particular members of the affected
population, that is, whether the likelihood of incurring harm is 1
in 1,000, 1 in 10,000, or 1 in a million.66 Thus, for example, the
plurality of the Supreme Court held in Industrial Union Depart-

59. See Clean Air Hearings, supra note 50, at 282-83 (statement of Carol
Administrator, EPA).

M.

Browner,

60. See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976).
61. See ROBERT PERCNAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 123-24 (Supp.
1998) (outlining BPA's "Co=on Sense Implementation Plan").
62 See American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F3d 1027, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per cu
riam).
63. See, e.g., R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CA SE OF THE
CLEAN AIR Acr 275-76 (1983) (discussing lead). The inlportance of considering population
size is stressed in JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP VISCUS!, CALCULATING RISKS? 91-108
(1999).
64. See MELNICK, supra note 63, at 275-76.
65. See infra Section VI.A.4.
66. See Clean Air Hearings, supra note 50, at 280-81 (statement of Carol
Administrator, EPA).

M.

Browner,
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ment v. American Petroleum Institute ("Benzene Case")61

that
OSHA may regulate only "significant risks," and that a risk of
one in a billion could not count as significant.68 OSHA now con
cludes that a lifetime annual risk of 1.64/1,000 would count as sig
nificant.69 But undoubtedly the importance of addressing such a
risk will depend on other factors, notably including the size of the
affected population.
• The severity of the risk
for example, whether it involves cancer
or mortality risks, or increased hospital admissions, bronchitis,
respiratory symptoms, lost work days, or what EPA calls minor
restricted activity days.70
Although EPA considers all of these questions in issuing national
standards,71 it has developed no clear guidelines to discipline its judg
ment about when one or another level of regulation is appropriate. It
has not said, for example, that if 100,000 people face a cancer risk of
1/1,000, regulation is presumptively desirable, but if 10,000 face a
1/1,000 chance of minor respiratory problems, regulation is presump
tively not desirable.72 A reading of EPA's voluminous documents on
the major air pollutants provides an enormous amount of data, but lit
tle information on the answers that would trigger a decision to in
crease or decrease regulation. As we will see, all of the various points
noted above might reasonably be turned into a kind of global figure,
for example "quality-adjusted life years," designed to quantify the
various benefits from regulation.73
One final note: An obvious and important question has to do with
the distributional effects of national ambient air quality standards.

-

67. 448 U.S. 6ITT (1980).
68. See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 612.
69. See Building & Constrs. Trade Dep't v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
70. See U.S. EPA INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES & ECONOMICS GROUP, OFFICE OF AIR
QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR TIIE
PARTICULATE MATTER AND OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND
PROPOSED REGIONAL HAzE RULE 12-43 (1997) [hereinafter RIA].
71. See, e.g., The Science Behind EPA's Proposed Revisions to the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Ozone and Particulate Matter, Parts I-Ill: Hearings Before the Sub·
comm. on Energy and Environment of the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong. 455-56
(1997) ("I determined that setting an appropriate air quality standard for a pollutant for
which there is no discernible threshold means that factors such as the nature and severity of
the health effects involved, and the nature and size of the sensitive populations exposed, are
very important."); see also LANDY ET AL., supra note 13, at 44-82 (discussing ozone);
MELNICK, supra note 63, at 269-76 (discussing lead).
72. Compare OSHA, which has said that if a risk is 1.64/1,000, regulation will be pre
sumed desirable and the risk will be found significant. See infra note 243.
73. See Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, LAW & .
CONTEMP. PR.OBS., Autumn 1976, a t 5, 11; see also American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175
F.3d 1027, 1039-40 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
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Who bears the costs? Who receives the benefits? Full information is
not available. But an early study finds that under the Act, poor peo
ple, and African Americans, are net gainers, whereas wealthy people,
and whites, are net losers74 - perhaps not a shocking finding in light
of the fact that many of the adverse effects of air pollution are concen
trated in large cities.
In sum: The Act has produced many improvements in air quality,
but the questions about federalism, cost-benefit analysis, and the con
cept of "safety" raise serious concerns about the Act and about BPA
performance. As we will see, these criticisms have implications for the
constitutionality of the Act and the resurgence of the nondelegation
doctrine, as well as for more general concerns of democracy and ac
countability.
B. Revising National Standards - and the Tyranny ofthe Status Quo
In 1971, BPA issued six national standards, governing ozone, par
ticulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and total
suspended particulates 2.5.75 In 1978, EPA issued a seventh standard,
involving lead; it did so as a result of a court order.76 These seven
regulations amount to the centerpiece of BPA's regulatory system for
the control of national ambient air quality.
Of course it would be extremely surprising if the standards origi
nally adopted in 1971 and 1978 turn out to survive new scientific evi
dence, and many people have urged that adjustments are desirable, in
the direction of both tightening and loosening existing requirements.
Congress has thus created an "agency-forcing" mechanism designed to
require BPA reconsideration of primary and secondary standards.
Under the Act, BPA is required to review the relevant criteria and
standards at least once every five years, and to revise them "as appro
priate" under the statutory guidelines.77 EPA is specifically required
to consider, and to explain any significant departures from, the rec
ommendations of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
("CASAC"), an independent committee established specifically in or
der to advise the Administrators on air quality criteria and standards.78
A great deal of time and expense is necessary to respond to new scien-

74. See Henry M. Peskin, Environmental Policy and the Distribution of Benefits and
Costs, in CURRENT ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 144, 147-59 (Paul Portney ed.,
1978).
75. See infra app. for details.
76. See id.
77. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(l) (1994).
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(d)(2)(B), 7607(d)(3).
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tific information, thus making the revision process extremely cumber
some.
So much for the statutory requirements; the possibility of litigation
raises further complexities. The most general point is that EPA is vul
nerable to suits by those seeking more stringent controls and new
regulations based on apparent evidence of hazards at existing levels.79
If EPA does not act within the statutory period, or if it decides not to
impose more stringent controls, it will predictably be faced by a suit
from an environmental organization - one that, in view of likely sci
entific evidence, has a nontrivial chance of success.80 This is so espe
cially in light of a recent judicial suggestion that the Administrator
may be barred from declining "to establish a margin of safety in the
face of documented adverse health effects."81 But EPA is also vulner
able to challenges by industry whenever it tightens a standard. Crea
tive lawyers have a quite good chance of successfully challenging an
EPA regulation whether it has tightened, or refused to tighten, exist
ing standards.82
It is therefore possible to venture a prediction: The day will even
tually come when the same court of appeals holds that EPA has be
haved unlawfully both for regulating above a certain level and also for
not regulating below that level! The basic point is that the centrality
of litigation to environmental protection creates a new form of tyr
anny of the status quo - a great deal of inertia in favor of the existing
regulatory framework, whatever its content. The general problem for
modern administrative law is that because of the complexity of the sci
entific evidence, skilled advocates are highly likely to be able to find a
serious problem in the agency's rationale, a factor that makes rule
making extremely cumbersome and increasingly encourages agencies
to avoid it altogether.83
C.

The Record

Thus far it might be tempting to be quite skeptical of the Act - to
think that it rests on false assumptions, that it foolishly ignores costs

79. For recent evidence, see, for example, American Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388
(D.C. Cir. 1998), and Corrosion ProofFittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
80. See, e.g., American Lung Ass'n, 134 F3d at 389 (requiring EPA to give a better justi
fication for its failure to establish a new standard for sulfur dioxide emissions).
81. Id. at 393 (leaving the issue undecided on the ground that the Administrator did not
adequately explain her judgment that no public health threat exists).
82 See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per cu
riam).
83. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 41 ADMIN. L.
REV. 59, 60-62 (1995).
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and state-by-state variations, that it invites excessive litigation, and
that it is an extremely crude foundation for regulatory policy. There is
considerable sense in these skeptical reactions. But it must also be ac
knowledged that the Act has done a great deal of good - indeed, that
reductions in air pollution can plausibly be counted among the sub
stantial success stories in regulatory government in the last half
century.84 The good news is that for all of the pollutants, there have
been large improvements in ambient air quality. Consider the fol
lowing table:85

TABLE 1: AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS 1986-95
Air quality change (%)
Carbon monoxide
Lead
Nitrogen dioxide
Ozone
Phlio*
Sulfur dioxide

-37
-78
-14
-6
-22
-37

Emissions change (%)
-16
-32
-3 (nitrogen oxides)
-9 (VOCs)
-17
-18

*PM10 changes are based on 1988-95 data
Even the cost-benefit ratio appears to be quite good. A general
review contains many criticisms of American efforts at environmental
protection, but concludes that "the benefits of the Clean Air Act seem
clearly to outweigh the costs."86 Thus a study of EPA rulemaking be
tween 1990 and 1995 found that the costs outweighed the benefits by
no less than $70 billion.87
On the other hand, better tools could have produced similar results
at a far lower cost. For example, there is evidence that with economic
incentives, EPA could have achieved the same benefits at one-quarter
of the costs.88 There is also a problem of poor priority-setting. EPA's
own studies suggest that it is not devoting resources to the most seri
ous problems and indeed that inadequate priority-setting is a particu
lar problem for clean air regulation, where large problems (such as in
door air pollution) receive relatively little attention.89 An important

84. See, e.g., EAS1ERBROOK, supra note 28, at 181-83.
85. See DAVIES & MAzUREK, supra note 7, at 17 (calculated from data from U.S. EPA
OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS REsEARCH, NATIONAL AIR
QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT (1995), at 69-77 (1996)).
86. DAVIES & MAzUERK, supra note 54, at 31.
87. See id. But see LUTIER, supra note 8, at 2-3.
88. See TOM TIETENBURG, EMISSIONS TRADING 38-59 (1985).
89. See DAVIES & MAzUREK, supra note 54, at 24-30.
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task for the future is to ensure that EPA devotes limited public and
private resources to the most serious environmental hazards.90
D.

Particulates and Ozone at EPA: A Case in Point

These issues are hard to understand in the abstract; it will be useful
to understand them in light of EPA's recent effort to revise its regula
tions governing particulates and ozone. Notably, the origins of the
new particulates standards can be found not in an independent deci
sion by EPA, but in a 1993 suit by the American Lung Association,
which sought to compel EPA to complete its review of the particulate
matter ("PM") standard.91 The district court ordered EPA to issue a
proposed rule by November 29, 1996, and a final rule by July 18, 1997.
Here are the key points in EPA's analysis and justification, which
raise recurring issues about what findings agencies must make during
standard-setting in the environmental arena.
1.

The New Standards: Massive Scientific Evidence

The final rules for particulates and ozone were based on a massive
amount of evidence, involving thousands of pages of documents.92
EPA's public justification for these standards is extremely long and
impressively detailed but in important respects vague and conclusory.
It is filled with legalistic arguments, with reports on specific studies
having ambiguous implications for the particular issue of what
standard to select, and with qualitative judgments that leave a great
deal of uncertainty about the magnitude of the effects.93 To EPA's
credit, it does not suggest that "safety" is an on-off switch; it
acknowledges that this is a question of degree.94 But EPA does not
explain, in quantitative terms, why the level it chose is preferable to
more stringent or less stringent alternatives.

90. This is a general theme of BREYER, supra note 5. In a claim of direct relevance to
the central claims of this Article, Breyer rejects the idea of congressional priority-setting and
makes a plea instead for executive branch oversight of regulatory activity. See id. at 90-102.
91. See American Lung Ass'n v. Browner, 884 F. Supp. 345 (D. Ariz. 1994). The district
court presided over an ambitious timing schedule, one that was resisted by EPA as exces
sively ambitious in view of the need to compile and process a great deal of relevant informa
tion.
92. Some of the data upon which EPA relied in making its conclusions is held by third
parties and has not been released to the public. The nonpublic nature of this information
raises some problems with EPA's regulation, because without access to the data, it is hard to
evaluate some of EPA's factual claims.

93. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,652, 38,650-81 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
94. See id. at 38,656.
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A general review of the evidence suggests that there could well be
both high benefits and high costs from the new particulates standard.95
For the new ozone standard, both costs and benefits appear
significantly lower.96 EPA offered a great deal of detail about the
harms apparently caused by particulates and ozone at existing levels.
It also acknowledged uncertainties in the evidence. There are
extensive discussions of the scientific literature. In an illustrative
comment, Administrator Browner publicly defended the 0.08 ppm
standard for ozone:
because, though it is in the middle of the range recommended for consid
eration by CASAC and the EPA staff paper, as a policy choice it reflects
the lowest level recommended by individual CASAC panel members and
it is the lowest level tested and shown to cause effects in controlled hu
man-exposure health studies.97
EPA ultimately chose a standard of 15165 for "fine" particulates more specifically, an annual standard, for P�, of 15 µg/m3, based on
the three-year average of the annual arithmetic mean Phlz.s
concentrations; it also set an hourly standard of 65 µg/m3, based on the
three-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour Phlz.s
concentrations.
These were new standards; previous standards
involved "coarse" particulates, PMi.0•98 There is some dispute about
the extent to which the new standards represent a significant increase
in stringency, because they govern particulates of a smaller diameter,
and relative stringency, in any geographic region, depends on the size
distribution of the particulate matter in that region; in areas
dominated by coarse particulates, including some western cities, there
is little increase in stringency.99 EPA set a 0.08 ppm standard for
ozone averaged over an eight-hour period, replacing the previous 0.12
ppm standard, averaged over a one-hour period.
The heart of EPA's analysis is as follows.100 (I discuss particulates
as an illustration.) EPA begins by referring to "the greatly expanded
95. See infra app. tbl.11.
96. See infra app. tbl.12.
97. Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 50, at 279-80 (statement of Carol M. Browner,
Administrator, EPA).
98. PMi0 refers to particulates with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10
micrometers; P� refers to particulates with diameter less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers.
With the new P� standards, EPA also tightened the standard for PMi0 by limiting permis
sible deviations from the previous standard. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,652.
99. See Robert Yuhnke, Particles of Concern, ENVTL. FORUM, March/April 1997, at 24,
25-29 (contending that the simultaneous change in regulation of the two kinds of particulates
will decrease regulation and increase health risks in various places, including Denver).
100. See generally National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62
Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
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body of community epidemiological studies."101 This evidence shows a
range of adverse health effects, including premature mortality and
increased hospital admissions; and there is also evidence that children,
the elderly, and asthmatics are most vulnerable to these effects. More
particular evidence emerges from quantitative risk estimates from two
"example cities," estimates that include a judgment that existing
standards create residual risks of "hundreds of premature deaths each
year, hundreds to thousands of respiratory-related hospital
admissions, and tens of thousands of additional respiratory[-]related
symptoms in children."102 (In an inadvertently hilarious qualification,
EPA adds that the "epidemiological findings cannot be wholly
attributed to inappropriate or incorrect statistical methods,
misspecification of concentration-effect models, biases in study design
or implementation, measurement errors" and the like.103) EPA notes
that the results "should be interpreted cautiously," especially in light
of "the lack of demonstrated mechanisms" to explain the
epidemiological findings, but should be taken to "provide ample
reason to be concerned that there are detectable health effects
attributable to PM at levels below the current NAAQS."104
BPA's basic claim is that "the increase in relative risk is small for
the most serious outcomes" but "significant from an overall public
health perspective, because of the large number of individuals in sensi
tive populations that are exposed to ambient PM, as well as the signifi
cance of the health effects involved."105 International evidence, and
evaluations by over 1,000 experts, supported the view that the existing
standard was insufficiently protective.106 Much of EPA's discussion
involves the fact that existing evidence does not reveal mechanisms to
explain the range of reported adverse effects.107 And frequently EPA
repeats what appears to be a key phrase, almost a mantra, to the effect
that the data "provides the basis for decisions on standard levels that
would reduce risk sufficiently to protect public health with an ade
quate margin of safety, recognizing that such standards will not be
risk-free."108 Thus EPA says "there is ample reason to be concerned
that exposure to ambient PM at levels allowed under the current air

101. Id. at 38,655.
102 Id. at 38,656.
103. Id. at 38,656.
104. Id. at 38,656-57.
105. Id. at 38,657.
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., id. at 38,664-65.
108. Id. at 38,674.
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quality standards presents a serious public health problem."109 EPA
offers detailed discussions of criticisms of the epidemiological findings
and offers what appear to be reasonable responses.U0 As we will see,
EPA's presentation of all the relevant data shows reason for concern
about adverse health effects at current levels, but leaves many doubts
about why EPA chose the particular standards it did, rather than stan
dards somewhat higher or somewhat lower.

2.

Insufficient Consideration of the Alternatives

To EPA's credit, it does offer some discussion of both less strin
gent and more stringent alternatives.111 But the discussion is quite
brief, especially considering the centrality of the comparative ques
tion. As against the less stringent possibilities, EPA says that "despite
well recognized uncertainties, the consistency and coherence of the
epidemiological evidence and the seriousness of the health effects re
2
quire a more protective response . . ."11 As against those who argued
for more stringent regulation, EPA said that "the inherent scientific
uncertainties are too great" and also that such regulation "might result
in regulatory programs that go beyond those that are needed to effec
tively reduce risks to public health."113 Studies "provide some sugges
tion of risks extending to lower concentrations, [but] they do not pro
vide a sufficient basis for establishing a lower annual standard
level."114 Because this point is so important, it is worthwhile noting
that EPA spoke in similarly vague terms for ozone, saying that more
stringent regulation would prevent
.

certain . . . effects, [that] while judged to be adverse, are transient and reversible, . . . and the more serious effects with greater immediate and potential long-term impacts on health are less certain, both. as to the per
centage of individuals exposed to various concentrations who are likely
to experience such effects and as to the long-term significance of these
effects.115
These are minimally informative generalities. Hence any reader is
likely to be puzzled about exactly why EPA chose the particular
regulations it did - about why it did not regulate either somewhat
more or somewhat less. A special puzzle is why EPA did not impose

109. Id. at 38,665.
110. See id. at 38,658-65.
111. See id. at 38,665-66, 38,674-77.
112 Id. at 38,675.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 38,676.
115. Id. at 38,868.
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more stringent controls on particulates; the Regulatory Impact Analy
sis116 ("RIA") shows that a more stringent regulation could have pro
duced $4 billion in increased health benefits.117 The problem is not
that EPA was careless or offhand; its exhaustive documentation was
anything but that. The problem is that in the explanation accompa
nying the final rules, EPA did not attempt to quantify the risks under
competing standards, nor did it show the basic value judgment that
would deem one risk too high, another risk acceptable, and another
risk too low (that is, below the level requisite to protect the public
health).
In many ways, the most informative document is the RIA. This is
the most informative document because it provides actual numbers on
the benefit (including nonmonetized and monetized quantities) and
cost sides. It is also a tribute to Executive Order 12,866, requiring
cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") even when CBA cannot be the basis for
decision.118 The problem is that in its justification, EPA made little use
of this document. Indeed, the RIA was written by a separate group in
North Carolina, and it appears to have had little or no influence on the
ultimate decision. Some of the benefits calculations appear to have
been rejected by EPA itself in the official justification. Nonetheless,
the RIA provides the only systematic discussion of the consequences
of the approach chosen and of alternative approaches. Here is some
of what the RIA says:
1. The new particulates regulation would prevent 350 annual mor
talities; 6,800 cases of chronic bronchitis; 1,100 cases of acute
bronchitis; about 1,200 hospital admissions from, for example,
congestive heart failure (130) and respiratory episodes (470);
106,000 lost work days; and 879,000 minor restricted activity
days.119
2. For the selected ozone standard, the new regulation would pre
vent 0 to 80 deaths, 130 emergency department visits for
asthma, 29,840 acute respiratory symptoms, 0 to 530 chronic
bronchitis cases, 0 to 20 hospital admissions for congestive
heart failure, 0 to 50,440 lost work days, 0 to 420,300 minor re-

116. The RIA was produced pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. (1993 com
pilation) 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (1996), which requires analysis of the costs
and benefits of major regulations. In this case, the RIA was produced by a separate group
within EPA, the Innovative Strategies and Economics Group in Research Triangle Park,
North Carolina. It is not clear to what extent the RIA actually reflects the views of EPA or
affected the outcome.
117. See infra app. tbl 11. (The tables in the appendix are taken from information in the
RIA.) Note that this compares the highest benefit estimate; unfortunately, the RIA does
not give lowest benefits estimates for the two alternatives.
118. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 639.
119. See infra app. tbl.2.
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stricted activity days.120 (Note that in both cases the RIA speci
fies a range, which is a tribute to candor in the midst of scien
tific uncertainty.)
3. All these benefits are monetized: $4.8 million per life saved,
$120,000 per life-year saved, $12,700 per respiratory illness,
$16,600 per congestive heart failure for those over 65, $9,000
for emergency department visits for asthma, $260,000 for
chronic bronchitis, $83 per lost work day, $38 per minor re
stricted activity day.121
4. For ozone, the overall cost-benefit analysis122 shows benefits of
$0.4 billion (low-end estimate) to $2.1 billion (high-end esti
mate), and costs of $1.1 billion. For particulates, the benefits
range from $19 billion to $104 billion, whereas the costs are an
ticipated to be $8.6 billion. A noteworthy point is that the
ozone rule might have negative net benefits of $0.7 billion, if
the low-end estimate is correct; note also that if the health
benefits of ground-level ozone (discussed below in Section
VI.A.5) are included in the calculation, the negative net bene
fits - or more simply net costs - of the rule are higher still.
5. The RIA also suggests the costs and benefits of the two alterna
tives.123 The more stringent particulates standard would have
high-end benefits of $108 billion and costs of $9.4 billion; the
less stringent would have high-end benefits of $90 and costs of
$5.5 billion.124 The less stringent ozone standard would have
high-end benefits of $1.6 billion and costs of $0.9 billion; the
more stringent would have high-end benefits of $2.9 billion and
costs of $1.4 billion.125
A serious gap in the RIA is that it does not give low-end estimates
for the benefits associated with the alternatives; only high-end esti
mates are given for these. For the options actually chosen, a range is
specified, which greatly assists assessment of EPA's judgment. But
\vithout the range, it is hard to compare the options not chosen.
An additional problem, reflected in EPA's explanation as a whole,
is the absence of a detailed assessment - even a wholly benefits-based
assessment - of why the options that were chosen were deemed supe
rior to those that were not chosen. The most noteworthy point here is
that by EPA's own accounting, the more stringent particulates stan120. See infra app. tbl3.
121. See infra app. tbl.4.
122 See infra app. tbl.12.
123. See infra app. tbls.11 & 12.
124. See infra app. tbl.11.
125. See infra app. tbl.12.
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dard could have produced $4 billion in greater benefits (on the high
end estimate). This would seem to count as a substantial improve
ment in public health, especially considering the fact that each life is
valued at $4.8 million; translated into lives, the more stringent regula
tion could prevent more than 200 additional deaths each year! EPA
did not square this conclusion with its decision not to choose more
stringent regulation. Indeed, EPA's own calculations showed that a
tighter particulates standard would have produced far greater health
benefits than the ozone standard; this leaves a serious unexplained
anomaly in the two standards taken together.126 A possible explana
tion for not tightening the particulates standard is that the consensus
of CASAC members did not support doing so, a consensus that raises
questions about the RIA itself; but BPA did not offer a "benefits
analysis" that would resolve these uncertainties.
In this light, what overall evaluation would be reasonable? If
BPA's conclusions are correct, the particulates regulation promises
significant benefits and the ozone regulation promises relatively small
benefits. The basic problem is that the agency has not explained, in
concrete terms, why it chose one level of regulation rather than an
other. Now let us shift to the nondelegation issue.
III. THE PATH OF THE LAW
If we can just get our legislators to legislate we'll be able to understand

their goals well enough. I'm not saying we may not still end up with a
fair number of clowns as representatives, but at least then it will be be
cause clowns are what we deserve.

27
-John Hart Ely1

The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete failure . .. . The time
has come for the courts to acknowledge that the non-delegation doctrine
is unsatisfactory ....

1
-Kenneth Culp Davis 28

A.

The Old Nondelegation Doctrine: One Good Year, Two Hundred
and Two Bad Years

Despite its extremely infrequent use, the old nondelegation doc
trine should be quite familiar. In a nutshell, it requires Congress to
state an "intelligible principle" by which to guide and limit agency ac126. See Lutter & DeMuth, supra note 8, at 3.
127. JOHNHART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
134 (1980).
128. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 713
(1969).
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tion.129 The motivating idea is that Article I, Section 1, vests legislative
power in the Congress and that this vesting cannot be waived, even if
Congress and the public want to do so. If Congress gives the executive
a "blank check," or states no intelligible principle, it has violated Arti
cle I.
According to the standard view, the nondelegation doctrine was a
core part of the original Constitution, and its abandonment, in the af
termath of the New Deal, represented a kind of capitulation to per
ceived national needs.130 I believe that the Constitution does contain a
nondelegation doctrine; but the standard view is much too simple. For
one thing, there is no express nondelegation doctrine in the text of the
Constitution, which must therefore be counted as ambiguous on the
point.131 To be sure, legislative power is vested in Congress, and it is
reasonable to infer that the power thus vested cannot be given to
someone else. But there is no clear textual barrier to delegations, and
in fact there is no explicit evidence that the Framers and ratifiers of
the original Constitution believed that it contained a nondelegation
doctrine.132 Actually the early practice suggested considerable willing
ness to "delegate" authority. In the second year of the Republic,
Congress gave the President the power to grant licenses to trade with
the Indian tribes "by such rules and regulations as the President shall
prescribe."133 The first Congress provided for military pensions "un
der such regulations as the President of the United States may di-

129.
1971)

See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat

Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 745-47 (D.D.C.

130. See ELY, supra note 129, at 131-34; DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
REsPONSIBILITY 13, 37-39, 165-79 (1997); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Adminis
trative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1237-41 (1994).
131. As a comparison, consider the German Constitution, which does contain an explicit
nondelegation principle. Article 80(1) requires that the content, purpose, and extent of the
legislative authorization be specified in the statute itself.
See GRUNDGESTETZ
[CONSTITUTION) [G.G.) art. 80(1) (F.RG.); see also DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 125-34 (1995).
132. Consider in this regard the treatment of the interpretive question in Ernest
Gellhom, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 345, 347-48 (1987), which
attempts to show the constitutional roots of the nondelegation doctrine (a) by showing that
John Locke believed in a nondelegation principle, (b) by emphasizing that the Framers
believed in Locke's contractarian view, and (c) by referring to the Constitution's provision
for lawmaking. None of this establishes that the Framers accepted a nondelegation doctrine.
I use this example because Gellhom is one of the outstanding administrative Jaw scholars of
the last thirty years, and also an enthusiast for the nondelegation doctrine; his inability to
show a direct constitutional source for the doctrine shows that any judgment on its behalf is
largely a matter of inferences.
133. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 33, 1
137 (1790).

Stat.
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rect."134 In neither case did Congress issue standards by which to limit
the President's discretion.
The standard view also fits uncomfortably with judicial practice. It
is often remarked that the Supreme Court last used the nondelegation
doctrine to invalidate a federal statute in 1935. What is less often re
marked is that the Court first used the nondelegation doctrine to in
validate a federal statute in exactly the same year. While earlier cases
had suggested the existence of a nondelegation doctrine,135 the Court
upheld a number of broad delegations,136 and hence for the first 138
years of the nation's existence - as well as the last sixty-four years no Supreme Court decision struck down a statute on nondelegation
grounds.
Let us briefly explore the two decisions of 1935, the nondelegation
doctrine's only good year. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,131 the
Court invalidated a section of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
saying that "the President is authorized to prohibit the transportation
in interstate commerce" of oil priced in violation of state-imposed
production quotas.138 The Court said that the defect lay in the absence
of standards specifying exactly when the President was to exercise this
power.139 This is a controversial ruling, fitting poorly with post-World
War II decisions, and it is most unlikely that the Court would follow it
today. But the largest decision, one that has not been overruled even
implicitly, was A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States,140 where
the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act as a
whole.141 In invalidating the Act, the Court made three critical points.
First, the statutory standards were open-ended and self-contradictory
- no constraint at all on government approval of "codes."142 From
the statutory language alone, it was very hard to generate ceilings and

134. An Act Providing for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States,
ch. 24, 1 Stat 95 (1789).
135. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404-06 (1928);
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 510 {1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-93
(1892); The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813).
136. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., 276 U.S. at 404-06; Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 510-11.
137. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
138. See Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 433 (citing National Industrial Recovery Act
§ 9(c), Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1934)).
139. See 293 U.S. at 426-30.
140. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
141. It is an interesting historical fact that on the day of the decision, President
Roosevelt did not seem much to object to judicial invalidation of a centerpiece of his New
Deal, apparently on the theory that the NIRA experiment had been a failure. See KENNETII
S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 516-17 (1986).
142 See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 523.
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floors on governmental action. Second, the Court said that the Act es
sentially delegated public power to private groups.143 Congress could
not legitimately authorize private persons to create law in their pre
ferred form. Because accountable officials did not "filter" efforts at
private lawmaking, this did not merely raise the spectre of faction, it
was the thing itself - the co-optation of public power by self
interested private groups. Third, and in a discussion of particular rele
vance to the general subject here, the Court distinguished other stat
utes, most notably the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Act, partly
by reference to the procedural safeguards provided by those statutes.
"What are 'unfair methods of competition' are thus to be determined
in particular instances, upon evidence, in the light of particular com
petitive conditions and of what is found to be a specific and substantial
public interest. To make this possible, Congress set up a special pro
cedure."144 As we will see, the seeds of the new nondelegation doc
trine can be found in this passage, insofar as procedures are under
stood as a surrogate for clear congressional instructions.145
In the decades since Schechter Poultry, however, nondelegation
challenges have been routinely repudiated.146 Indeed, the Court has
upheld some apparently extreme grants of authority to the executive
branch.147 But there have been a few conflicting signals. In the most
visible opinion, Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum
Institute,148 better known as the Benzene Case, the basic question was
whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act called for (a) cost
benefit balancing (as urged in a concurrence by Justice Powell),149 (b)
demonstration that any regulated risk be "significant" (as urged in the
plurality opinion of four Justices, written by Justice Stevens), 150 or (c)
agency action whenever there was any risk at all (as urged in a dis
senting opinion of four Justices, written by Justice Marshall). 151 Both
the plurality and Justice Rehnquist used the nondelegation doctrine,
but ultimately they sent conflicting signals about the proper place of
the doctrine.
143. See id. at 537.
144. Id. at 533 (citations omitted).
145. See infra Section V.A.1.
146. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); United States v. South
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
147. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-80; Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 167-78;
Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425-26.
148. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
149. See Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 664-71 (Powell, J., concurring).
150. See id. at 614-15 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
151. See id. at 690-91, 713-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

334

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:303

Then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Act should be struck
down on nondelegation grounds.152 In his view, Congress had made no
choice among the three alternatives.153 The statute was therefore an
unconstitutional delegation. Justice Rehnquist contended that the
statute was a kind of "mirage," in which Congress "simply avoid[ed] a
choice which was both fundamental for purposes of the statute and yet
politically so divisive that the necessary decision or compromise was
difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge."154
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion referred to the nondelegation
doctrine not to invalidate the Act but as a tool of statutory construc
tion.155 In the plurality's view, the agency's position would allow it
such massive power over the private sector as to create a possibly un
constitutional delegation of power.156 Partly for this reason, the Court
read the statute to require OSHA to show a "significant risk" before it
could undertake regulation.157 For the plurality, then, the nondelega
tion doctrine operated as a kind of clear statement principle, requiring
Congress to speak unambiguously if it sought to give (what the Court
saw as) open-ended authority to administrators.158 Note, however,
that the Court left the definition of the key term - "significant risk"
- to the agency, and that OSHA has yet to give a rule-like under
standing of that highly ambiguous term.159
In the immediate aftermath of the Benzene Case, there were occa
sional lower court suggestions that the nondelegation doctrine was "no
longer . . . moribund."160 A handful of lower courts cases have now in
voked the doctrine. Thus in Massieu v. Reno,161 a district court struck

152 See id. at 684 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
153. See id. at 672.
154. Id. at 681, 687 (specifically calling the feasibility requirement a "mirage").
155. See id. at 646.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 651.
158. There is much reason to question the plurality's analysis. OSHA did not urge that
it could do whatever it wanted; it did not say that the statute allowed it to regulate on what
ever terms it chose. On the contrary, it said whenever there was an identifiable risk to
workers, the statute required OSHA to regulate to the point where compliance was not fea
sible. This is a severe, even draconian statute, not so different from the Delaney Clause,
which barred any carcinogens in food color additives. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cos
metic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 379e{b){5){B) {1994). But a draconian statute is not an open·ended
delegation of authority. If Congress told EPA to eliminate any pollutant that causes any risk
at all, EPA's discretion would be sharply constrained. Accord American Trucking Ass'ns v.
EPA, Nos. 97-1440, 97-1441, 1999 WL 979463, at *9 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 29, 1999) {Silberman, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane).
159. See infra note 243.
160. See, e.g., Fort Worth & Denver R.R. v. Lewis, 693 F.2d 432, 435 n.8 {5th Cir. 1982).
161. 915 F. Supp. 681 {D.NJ. 1996).
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down a provision of a federal deportation statute saying that "[a]n
alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of
State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States is deport
able."162 On the court's view, this was an open-ended grant of power,
because the notion of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy con
sequences" could be construed in numerous different ways, thus rais
ing a risk of arbitrariness. And in South Dakota v. Department ofInte
rior,163 a court of appeals invalidated the Indian Reorganization Act
insofar as it authorized the Secretary of the Interior "in his discretion,
to acquire . . . any interest in lands . . . within or without existing reser
vations . . . for the purpose of providing land for Indians."164 But these
are extremely unusual cases, and because of the near abandonment of
the nondelegation doctrine in federal law, it is unlikely that other
courts would follow them, even on identical facts.
B.

What; IfAnything, Is the Nondelegation Doctrine For?

The opinions of Justice Rehnquist and the plurality in the Benzene
Case have spurred renewed interest in the nondelegation doctrine, and
many have argued for its revival.165 There has thus been a spirited de
bate over what purposes such a revival would serve, and whether, in
light of those purposes, a revival would be justified.166

1.

Nondelegation Values

It is possible to isolate several possible nondelegation values. First
and foremost, the doctrine is designed to promote a distinctive kind of
accountability - the kind of accountability that comes from requiring
specific decisions from a deliberative body reflecting the views of rep-

162 Massieu, 915 F. Supp. at 699 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act §
241(a)(4)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(C)(i) (1994) (current version at § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i))).
163. 69 F.3d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
164. South Dakota, 69 F3d at 882 (quoting Indian Reorganization Act § 5, 25 U.S.C. §
465).
165. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 130; Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom:
Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM U. L. REV. 295 (1987).
166. Leading discussions include DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN,
DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST PoLmCS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING
UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PuBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PuBLIC LAW 131-57 (1997);
SCHOENBROD, supra note 130; Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation
Doctrine from Constitutional and Policy Perspectives, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999);
Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM U. L.
REV. 277 (1987).
.
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resentatives from various states of the union. This is hardly to say that
the executive branch lacks accountability; of course the President is
subject to the will of the people.167 But the nondelegation doctrine
should be associated less with accountability in the abstract than with
the particular constitutional goal of ensuring a deliberative democracy,
one that involves not only accountability but also reflectiveness.168
The vesting of lawmaking power in Congress is designed to ensure the
combination of deliberation and accountability that comes from saying
that government power cannot be brought to bear on individuals un
less diverse representatives, from diverse places, have managed to
agree on the details. Consider, as an extreme example, the early deci
sion by the German legislature to confer on Adolf Hitler the power to
rule by "decree"; this delegation made possible lawmaking exercises
that would otherwise have been extremely cumbersome, and hence
removed an important check on arbitrary rule.169
A closely related point has to do with the extent to which law, and
particularly national legislation, can amount to an infringement on lib
erty. If no law may be brought to bear against the public unless di
verse members of Congress have been able to agree on a particular
form of words, then perhaps there is an important safeguard of free
dom. The underlying idea is that people may not be subject to na
tional legal constraints unless and until there has been specific legisla
tive authorization for the constraints. This idea can in tum be
associated with social contract theory, allowing people to maintain
certain private law rights unless there has been explicit authorization
for what would otherwise be a common law wrong.170

167. As emphasized in MASHAw, supra note 166, at 145-48, 152-56.
168. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON (1994). On deliberative
democracy generally, see DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Bister ed., 1998) and JORGEN
lIABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., The MIT Press 1996)
(1992).
169. See CURRIE, supra note 131, at 125-26.
170. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 27-32 (4th ed. 1999). There is, however, a problem with this conception of freedom,
a particular problem in the aftermath of the New Deal: Why should we think that the status
quo embodies freedom, and that the new law at issue would threaten to abridge freedom? It
is far from clear, for example, that the common law system for regulating pollution - itself a
regulatory system, and anything but prepolitical - should be taken as an embodiment of
liberty, and that a Clean Air Act is a liberty-threatening abridgement of that freedom.
Compare this to the area of discrimination: Is a law forbidding discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, or disability something that threatens liberty, such that it is crucial to obtain legis
lative agreement on its details, lest liberty be threatened? Or might the discriminatory status
quo be the real threat to freedom? Questions of this kind seem to me to raise serious doubts
about the idea that a strictly enforced nondelegation doctrine would promote liberty, prop
erly conceived. On the general topic of status quo neutrality, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CoNSTITUTION (1993).
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The nondelegation doctrine also promotes rule-of-law values. In
deed, the doctrine can be understood as a kind of "backdoor" void
for-vagueness doctrine, serving the same fundamental goals.171 It does
this, first, by promoting planning by ordinary people subject to law, by
giving them a sense of what is permitted and what is forbidden. It
does this, second, by cabining the discretionary authority of enforce
ment officials, who might otherwise act abusively or capriciously. In
both of these ways the nondelegation doctrine might be seen as a safe
guard against the Framers' core concerns - self-interested represen
tation and factional power. These points can be collected with the
suggestion that the nondelegation doctrine reflects the Constitution's
commitment to dual-branch lawmaking - a commitment that cabins
arbitrary power, and promotes deliberation as well as accountability,
by ensuring that governmental authority can be exercised only when
both the legislature and the executive have made a particular decision
to that effect.

2.

Against the Nondelegation Doctrine

A revival of the doctrine might be challenged on several grounds.
A large concern is institutional, involving judicial competence rather
than the doctrine on its merits.172 The difference between a permissi
ble and impermissible delegation - between "legislative" and "execu
tive" conduct - is one of degree, not one of kind. From what has
been said thus far, it should be clear that the line does not depend on
anything qualitative but on a quantitative issue, the precise amount of
delegated discretion, and there is no simple metric to tell how much
discretion is too much. It is for this reason that Justice Scalia, among
others, has urged that the nondelegation doctrine is largely unenforce
able by the federal judiciary, simply because it is not subject to princi
pled judicial application.173 If understood in these terms, the doctrine
might be taken as a judicially underenforced constitutional norm but a constitutional norm nonetheless.

171. Similarly, the void-for-vagueness doctrine might be seen as a backdoor nondelega
tion doctrine, requiring a legislature to speak with clarity. See Debra Livingston, Public Dis
cretion and the Quality ofLife in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 608-10 (1997). Both doctrines are also cousins of the plain meaning
rule in statutory construction, see John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 719 (1997), and are also closely connected with the project of de
mocracy-forcing mininlalism, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 27.
172 See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 32428 (1987).
173. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia's skepticism about judicial implementation of the nondelegation doctrine fits very well
with his skepticism about rule-free law. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIER OF
INTERPRETATION 5-15 (1997).
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These are largely institutional points; other objections cut deeper
against the doctrine. Sometimes Congress has good reasons to dele
gate. It may lack relevant information, not only about pollutants like
particulates and ozone, but about the social consequences of one or
another approach to regulation. It may also be aware of the existence
of rapidly changing circumstances, which may make any particular ap
proach increasingly anachronistic. For a multimember body, there are
serious problems in achieving closure on any particular course of ac
tion, and the result can be to push law in the direction of incompletely
specified abstractions.174 These points are independent of the phe
nomenon of delegating to escape the political consequences of speci
ficity, a phenomenon that undoubtedly plays a large role as well.175
The last point - about escaping accountability - is often taken as
a reason for invigorating the nondelegation doctrine in the name of
accountability;176 but Jerry Mashaw has urged the opposite - that
administrators should be making political decisions, precisely on
grounds of accountability.177
As Mashaw notes, agencies are
themselves politically accountable through their relationship to the
President.
Indeed, public choice theory may well suggest that
Congress is more, not less, susceptible to factional power than
bureaucrats acting under the arm of the President. There is evidence
that factional power is most influential precisely when Congress
legislates with particularity.178 In any case the issue cannot be resolved
in the abstract. And it is hard to come up with any a priori reason why
decisions by agencies would be worse, from the standpoint of
promoting social well-being, than decisions by Congress.
There is an empirical point here. It is not clear that from any point
of view, things have gone systematically better when Congress is clear
than when Congress is not.179 If we ask about promoting public wel-

174. See Aranson et al., supra note 166, at 21-27; Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann
Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5 (1999); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND PoLmCAL CONFLICT (1996) . See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note
166, at 230-31, for a general discussion suggesting, on the basis of a theoretical and empirical
investigation, that delegations are in large part a product of lack of congressional informa
tion.
175. See Aranson et al., supra note 166, at 32-34, 57-62.
176. See id. at 64-67; SCHOENBROD, supra note 130, at 171.
177. See MASHAW, supra note 166, at 145-57; see also EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra
note 166, at 10 ("Indeed, special interests may receive protection through favorable agency
regulations, but is this more widespread or morally more opprobrious than having them pro
tected through a tax loophole or a targeted provision in a bill?").
178. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAI.IDIRTY AIR 2658 (1986).
179. See Stewart, supra note 172, at 331-34. Thus the most extensive empirical and
theoretical treatment concludes that delegation is
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fare, or about agency competence and fair-dealing, it appears unim
portant to know whether Congress has spoken with clarity. The Inter
state Commerce Commission, for example, was one of the least well
respected agencies, and it operated under open-ended statutory terms;
the Securities and Exchange Commission is highly regarded, though
its organic statute is similarly open-ended. The Department of Agri
culture is one of the least well-regarded agencies, and the statutes it
administers are frequently all too clear. The Internal Revenue Service
is highly regarded, at least by specialists, and many of the provisions
that it must enforce are highly detailed. In short: There seems to be
no link between clear statutory terms and agency competence or
agency contribution to social well-being.

3.

The Centrality ofFloors and Ceilings

Thus it might be questioned whether a reinvigoration of the non
delegation doctrine would be a sensible response to any of the prob
lems and pathologies of the modern administrative state.180 Indeed it
would be foolish to suggest that such a revival would ensure better
regulatory policy, or even that it would mark a significant improve
ment in terms of democratic values. There is no basis for a revival of
the nondelegation doctrine. But the doctrine nonetheless deserves to
play a continuing if modest role in the constitutional regime.
Contrary to Mashaw's suggestion, administrators are often weakly
accountable to the President (or the electorate), and in any case
Congress has a distinctive kind of accountability, and it is that kind of
accountability that leads to its place as the institution entrusted with
the making of federal law. The Constitution would not tolerate a
legislative grant of authority to the President to enact such
environmental regulations as he deemed best, even though it is not
clear that such a grant would lead to inferior environmental policies.
The special form of political accountability anticipated by Article I,

a necessary counterbalance to the concentration of power in the hands of committees. In an
era where public policy becomes ever more complex, the only way for Congress to make all
important policy decisions internally would be to concentrate significant amounts of author
ity in the hands of powerful committee and subcommittee leaders, once again surrendering
policy to a narrow subset of its members . . . . In our view, delegation is a self-regulating sys
tem not in need of closer attention from the judiciary.
EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 166, at 237-38. The authors add that:

As it now works, the system of delegation allows legislators to play committees off against
agencies, dividing the labor across the branches so that no one set of actors dominates.
Given this perspective, limits on delegation would not only be unnecessary, they would
threaten the very individual liberties they purport to protect.

Id. at 238.
180. See Stewart, supra note
supra note 170, at 27-32.

172,

at

331-34. In

the same spirit, see

BREYER ET AL.,
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Section 1 does call for limitations on executive discretion. As we shall
see, this requirement is best promoted not by invalidating legislation,
but by statutory construction and by clear statement principles - the
real place where contemporary American law recognizes a
nondelegation doctrine, and where that doctrine now flourishes - and
also by judicial invalidation in the extremely rare cases where even
aggressive statutory construction is able to identify neither floors nor
ceilings.

IV. THE NEW NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
[E]ven with all its Frankenstein-like warts, knobs, and (concededly)
dangers, the unconstitutional delegation doctrine is worth hewing from
the ice.
-Antonin Scalia181

[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an
ability to delegate power under broad general directives.
-Mistretta v. United States182

In this Part, I discuss a set of developments in the modem law of
"nondelegation." The story begins with an imaginative essay by
Kenneth Culp Davis, offering a "new" nondelegation doctrine that
would require agencies, not Congress, to come up with binding con
straints on agency discretion. The story ends \vith a set of judicial de
velopments that firmly embrace this idea, by requiring agencies to in
terpret statutes in a way that sharply narrows agency discretion. To
this date, American Trucking is the culmination of these develop
ments.

A.

Kenneth Culp Davis's Interesting Innovation

Beginning with an important essay in 1969,183 Kenneth Culp Davis
proposed a new approach to the nondelegation doctrine. In its origi
nal form, he claimed, the doctrine was dead, and quite properly so.
Congress could not be expected to legislate specifically, and it should
not be asked to do so. But much of the doctrine could be rescued, and
could perform a salutary function, if agencies could be required to de
velop protections against uncontrolled discretionary power, and to ad
here to them. "The key should no longer be statutory words; it should
be the protections the administrators in fact provide, irrespective of

28.

181. Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, REGULATION, July/Aug., 1980, at 25,
182. 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
183. Davis, supra note 128.
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what the statutes say or fail to say."184 Thus Davis urged "a much
broader requirement, judicially enforced, that as far as is practicable
administrators must structure their discretionary power through ap
propriate safeguards and must confine and guide their discretionary
power through standards, principles, and rules."185 Davis thus pro
posed a shift from a requirement of statutory clarity to a requirement
of administrative clarity. In Davis's view, a central problem for the
regulatory state is excessive discretion - a system of "discretionary
justice."186 The remedy would be to require administrators to limit
their own room to maneuver.
The consequence of this requirement would be that rule-of-law
values would operate at the agency level. This would promote pre
dictability and minimize the arbitrary exercise of power. Synthesizing
a long period of work, Davis wrote that "[t]he basic purpose of the
traditional non-delegation doctrine is unsatisfactory and should be
changed. It should no longer be either to prevent delegation of legis
lative power or to require meaningful statutory standards."187 In
Davis' view, the

crucial consideration is not what the statute says but what the administra
tors do. The safeguards that count are the ones the administrators use,
not the ones mentioned in the statute . . . . The alteration in the non
delegation doctrine in this respect can be a rather small one: The courts
should continue their requirement of meaningful standards, except that
when the legislative body fails to prescribe the required standards for
discretionary action in particular cases, the administrators should be al
lowed to satisfy the requirement by prescribing them within a reasonable
time.188
Davis was not entirely clear about the legal source for this pro
posed requirement. He did not say whether courts should act pursu
ant to the Due Process Clause, Article I, the Administrative Proce
dure Act189 ("APA"), or the common law. In a remarkably short
treatment, he said that "[p]erhaps the non-delegation doctrine will
gradually turn into a facet of due process . . . . But in the longer term,
perhaps the constitutional base will give way to a common-law
base."190 This was less than a decade before the Court's ruling in Ver-

184. Id. at 713.
185. Id.
186. See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 10-35.
187. KENNEIH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 'TREATISE § 3:15, at 208 (2d ed.
1978).
188. Id. § 3:15, at 211.
189. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1994).
190. Davis, supra note 128, at 733.
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mont Yankee,191

the Erie Railroad of administrative procedure, that
there is no common law of administrative law. Though Davis did not
specify the source of his requirement, he clearly contemplated judicial
enforcement of his innovation.
B.

The (Early) Life ofan Idea

It is not clear to what extent subsequent judicial developments
were actually influenced by Davis's suggestion. But it is clear that in
the 1970s, a number of cases required administrators to generate rules
and criteria, and several such cases seemed to adopt an approach quite
close to that proposed by Davis.192
In a series of cases, courts held that an agency violated the Due
Process Clause if it did not generate criteria by which to limit its own
exercise of discretion. Thus, for example, courts held that liquor li
censes could not be given out without publicly articulated criteria,193
and that agencies were constitutionally obliged to say something about
the grounds on which they would give out public housing.194 But by far
the most prominent use of the idea came in Judge Leventhal's opinion
in the celebrated case upholding the wage and price freeze statute,

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally.195
The remarkably broad statutory provision at issue in that case
authorized the President "to issue such orders and regulations as he
may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries at
levels not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970. "196 Thus
Congress essentially gave no guidance to the President, at least not in
the text of the statute. A key part of Judge Leventhal's response and a somewhat desperate one under the circumstances - was to
suggest that there was a requirement that the executive develop
"subsidiary" administrative law, and stick to it.197 In his words, a
"feature that blunts the 'blank check' rhetoric is the requirement that
any action taken by the Executive under the law, subsequent to the
191. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Coun
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
192 See, e.g., Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1982); Jensen v. Administrator of
the FAA, 641 F.2d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1981); Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 232-34 (7th Cir.
1978); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1976); Burke v. United States, 968
F. Supp. 672, 680-81 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Martinez v. Ibarra, 759 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D. Colo.
1991); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134, 1139-40 (D.N.H. 1976).
193. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
194. See Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
195. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
196. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 202, 84 Stat. 799 (1970)
(repealed 1982).
197. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 759.
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freeze, must be in accordance with further standards as developed by
the Executive."198 This requirement was said to be "inherent in the
Rule of Law and implicit in the Act."199 Thus Judge Leventhal
emphasized the "requirement of subsidiary administrative policy,
enabling Congress, the courts and the public to assess the Executive's
adherence to the ultimate legislative standard . . . ."200 In his view,
"there is an on-going requirement of intelligible administrative policy
that is corollary to and implementing of the legislature's ultimate
standard and objective."201
There are several points to notice about this opinion. For those
steeped in regulatory policy - or from what might be called a more
contemporary perspective - the major constraints on the President
would come not from the idea of the Rule of Law but from the par
ticular context and background.202 These suggested that the Act was a
response to perceived "cost-push" inflation, that is, a situation in
which wage demands and price increases had created a kind of infla
tionary spiral, in which the anticipation of one would fuel an increase
in the other. Whatever the merits of this understanding of the eco
nomic situation, it suggests a real constraint on the President's author
ity: He may not favor particular industries or particular workers, and
all of his decisions must be made in terms of the underlying problem
that Congress meant to solve. This point suggests a much broader
one, to which I will return: An understanding of particular regulatory
programs, and their public rationale, will often lead both courts and
agencies to a narrower understanding of statutory terms, one that will
sharply discipline agency discretion. We might understand this as a
more modem approach to regulatory questions, one that diverts un
derstanding from the traditional lawyerly concern with "discretion,"
writ large, and shifts the focus to a better understanding of regulatory
policy.203 But Judge Leventhal did not take this approach.
In a sense, the approach that Judge Leventhal chose has a com
monality with Schechter Poultry itself, where, it will be recalled, the
198. Id. at 758.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 759.
201. Id.
202. See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 109-12 (2d ed. 1985).
203. This approach to administrative law is best associated with Justice Breyer. See
BREYER, supra note 5; STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). It sug
gests a significant shift from the legal culture's preoccupation with the control of discretion,
which is not the central problem for regulatory policy, toward a better understanding of
regulatory substance. In the same vein, see Stewart, supra note 172, at 323-29. Cf. RICHARD
A. POSNER, 'nm PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL 'niEORY 228-39 (1999) (empha
sizing the need for administrative law to engage with regulatory policy).
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Court pointed to procedural safeguards in the FTC Act as an impor
tant distinguishing feature.204 Procedural guarantees can be seen as a
check on arbitrary judgment, operating as a kind of (partial) surrogate
for clear statutory standards. The requirement of subsidiary adminis
trative law belongs in the same category - finding surrogate safe
guards in anything that operates as a constraint on the uncontrolled
discretion of the administrator.
Notably, Judge Leventhal invoked the requirement of "subsidiary
administrative law" to uphold a statute, not to invalidate agency ac
tion. And in the two decades after Amalgamated Meat Cutters, the de
cision was never understood to provide a tool by which troublesome
delegations might be invalidated. Indeed, it can be understood as part
of a range of surrogate safeguards, operating in Davis's spirit and
promoting nondelegation goals without invoking the nondelegation
doctrine.205 Thus much of the work of the doctrine, and of Davis's
proposal, ultimately came from judicial review of agency action for ar
bitrariness. Thus courts have required extremely detailed justifica
tions for agency rules under the "hard look" doctrine and in particular
they have required agencies to explain departures from past prac
tices. 206 The result has been to require, on nonconstitutional grounds,
at least some of what Davis proposed: clear articulation of agency

policy choices, a defense of those choices, and a requirement of adher
ence to those choices unless there was reason not to adhere to them. But
as we will see, these requirements have been confounded, or proved
inadequate, in some modem contexts; and because of their unantici
pated systemic effects on agency rulemaking, they raise serious diffi
culties of their own.207
C.

The Rise ofthe New Nondelegation Doctrine

Amalgamated Meat Cutters came to enjoy a rebirth, and also to be
understood differently, in an extremely important case, International
204. See supra text accompanying notes 140-144.
205. See Richard B. Stewart, The Interest-Representation Model ofAdministrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1699 n.144 {1975).
206. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-44
{1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 {1971); see also
Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 525-62
{1985); Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role ofthe Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 509, 511-15 (1974); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine,
1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 177. Note the revisionist attack on the doctrine. See MASHAW, supra
note 166; Pierce, supra note 83; Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judi
cial Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251
{1992).
207. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY {1992).
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Union v. OSHA.'21)8 The case involved a large-scale regulatory effort
by OSHA to protect workers, with "lock-outs" and informational
"tags," from the hazards of energy released from industrial machinery.
To simplify a complex story, the regulation at issue required employ
ers to place a "lock" on energy-isolating devices connected to the
equipment; or, alternatively, if the equipment could not be locked or if
another approach were equally effective, the employers were required
to place a warning "tag" on the energy isolating device, saying that
employees should not operate the device until the tag is removed.209
The only governing statutory language was remarkably brief. It
said that OSHA should issue regulations "reasonably necessary or ap
propriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of em
ployment."210 The first question was the meaning of this apparently
open-ended statutory term. OSHA said that this language required it
to regulate (a) any "significant risk" to (b) the point of "feasibility,"
that is, to the point where compliance would not be feasible for the in
dustry, either technologically or economically.211 In this way, OSHA
interpreted the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language in a
way quite similar to the plurality's interpretation of the statute insofar
as it governed toxic substances in the Benzene Case.212 Notice that on
the agency's interpretation, at least two ideas require a great deal of
interpretive work. How do we know whether a risk is "significant" what are the ingredients of that inquiry? And how do we know
whether an expenditure is "feasible"? Surely feasibility, like safety, is
not an off-on switch. It is not as if at a certain, naturally identifiable
point, an expenditure that had been feasible for industry is no longer
so.
But the lock-out/tag-out court did not press these points. Instead it
said that as the agency had interpreted the statute, the agency had
free-wheeling authority in individual cases to go from doing "nothing
at all" to "requir[ing] precautions that take the industry to the verge of
economic ruin .
. "213 In the court's view, the statute, so interpreted,
might well violate the nondelegation doctrine. Hence the court
remanded the case to the agency in order to give it an opportunity to
adopt an interpretation that would be both "reasonable and consistent
with the nondelegation doctrine."214 The court, or at least Judge
.

.

208. 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
209. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147 (1999).
210. 29 u.s.c. § 652(8) (1994).
211. See International Union, 938 F.2d at 1317.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 148-159.
213. International Union, 938 F.2d at 1317.
214. Id. at 1313.
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Williams, seemed to want the agency to use cost-benefit analysis as the
basis for decision,215 but it did not require that approach. What is
noteworthy here is that the court borrowed the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters idea, requiring agencies to discipline their own discretion
through "subsidiary administrative policy," so as to hold an agency
construction invalid unless it sufficiently limits agency discretion.
On remand, the agency added to its "significant risk" and "feasi
bility" constraints three different points: (1) the standard must use the
most cost-effective protective measures; (2) the agency must publish
an explanation of why any standard differing from an existing national
consensus standard would better promote the purposes of the Act; and
(3) the agency must support its choice of standard with record evi
dence and explain any inconsistency with prior agency practice.216 The
agency added that when it identified any significant risk, it must pro
vide "a high degree of worker protection," and would not be allowed
to do "nothing at all."217 Thus the agency attempted to meet the
court's challenge by suggesting that on any showing of evidence of
harm, there were clear ceilings and floors to discipline agency discre
tion.
With evident ambivalence, the court concluded that this was suffi
cient to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine.218 The court said that as
construed by the agency, its statutory authority for regulation in gen
eral would be quite close to its authority for toxic substances, which
did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.219 In both cases, an agency
must choose a "high degree of worker protection" once it finds a "sig
nificant risk," and it could not regulate past the point of "feasibility."
Even though these notions left a high degree of residual discretion, the
agency was not given a blank check, and hence the statute was accept
able as construed. The question left by the court's decision was
whether its invocation of the nondelegation doctrine was a kind of
sport, or whether it signaled a broader development in administrative
law.

215. See id. at 1326. This approach to OSHA differs from the American Trucking
court's approach to the Clean Air Act, which found cost-benefit analysis precluded by the
Act's explicit prohibition of cost considerations - BPA can consider only health benefits.
See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
216. See International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Control
of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout!fagout), 58 Fed. Reg. 16,612, 16,614 (1993)).
217. 37 F.3d at 669 (quoting 58 Fed. Reg. at 16,615).
218. See id.
219. See id.
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Particulates and Ozone in Court

EPA's regulations involving particulates and ozone were chal
lenged in American Trucking on a wide variety of grounds.220 The
most ambitious of the challenges, based on Amalgamate,d Meat Cutters
and International Union, was a claim that EPA's construction of the
Act resulted in an unconstitutional delegation of power. In a remark
able decision, the court of appeals agreed.221
The court's analysis was similar to that in International Union. As
the court noted, "the only concentration for ozone and PM that is ut
terly risk-free, in the sense of direct health impacts, is zero."222 The
problem was therefore that EPA lacks "any determinate criterion for
drawing lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too
much."223 To be sure, EPA pointed to some relevant considerations:
the nature and severity of the adverse health effects, the size of the
sensitive population at risk, and the degree of uncertainties involved.
The court thought it perfectly sensible to point to these considerations.
The problem is that they "do not themselves speak to the issue of de
gree."224 On the court's view, "EPA's formulation of its policy judg
ment leaves it free to pick any point between zero and a hair below
the concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog."225
With respect to ozone, EPA defended its shift from the existing
level of 0.09 to 0.08 on the ground that more people are exposed to
more serious effects at 0.09 than at 0.08.226 But a shift to 0.07 would be
still more effective in decreasing exposure levels, and "EPA never
contradicts the intuitive proposition, confirmed by data in its Staff Pa
per, that reducing the standard to that level would bring about compa
rable changes."227 Hence EPA's rationale pointed to no disciplining
criteria. To be sure, EPA said that a reduction to 0.07 would produce
more transient and reversible effects, and the more serious effects
would be less certain at that level. But this "seems to be nothing more

220. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per cu
riam). In fact the court accepted many of these challenges. It held, for example, that EPA
could not enforce its ozone standards, and that the ozone standard was arbitrary because the
agency had not adequately justified its refusal to consider the health benefits of ground-level
ozone, which, it is claimed, helps prevent cancer and cataracts. See id. at 1051-53.
221. See id. at 1034-40.
222 Id. at 1034.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1035.
225. Id. at 1037.
226. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856,
38,867-68 (1997) (discussed in American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1035).
227. American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1035.
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than a statement that lower exposure levels are associated with lower
risk to public health."228 The fact that EPA finds less severe and more
speculative effects at lower levels shows only that "the agency rightly
recognizes that the question is one of degree, but offers no intelligible
principle by which to identify a stopping point."229
In the most ambitious part of the opinion, the court said that in or
der for EPA to make rational decisions, it might be necessary to "as
sign weights" to a "range of ailments short of death . . . . "230 The court
referred with some approval to apparent decisions suggesting "some
readiness to adopt standards that leave non-zero residual risk," as, for
example, by using clinical criteria to decide what counts "as an adverse
health effect." And likelihood judgments might draw "from other ar
eas of the law, such as the familiar 'more probable than not' crite
rion."231 The court emphasized that "a one-size-fits-all criterion of
probability would make little sense." Thus,

all the relevant variables seem to range continuously from high to low:
the possible effects of pollutants vary from deaths to trivialities, and the
size of the affected population, the probability of an effect, and the asso
ciated uncertainty range from 'large' numbers of persons with point es
timates of high probability, to small numbers and vague ranges of prob
ability.232
The court added: "Nonetheless, an agency wielding the power
over American life possessed by EPA should be capable of developing
the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm that takes into account
population affected, severity and probability."233 The court referred in
this regard to the approach used by Oregon in devising a health plan
for poor people. Oregon has used the notion of "quality-adjusted life
years" to assess health gains, and a similar approach might be used to
assess health risks. Hence the court held that the regulations, as justi
fied, were unlawful. But it left undecided the question whether they
should be vacated, an issue addressed below.234
American Trucking creates a genuinely new nondelegation doc
trine. The new doctrine requires agencies to discipline their own dis
cretion through statutory interpretation. The basic idea is that agen
cies must, on pain of constitutional invalidity, generate "floors" and

228. Id.
229. Id. at 1036-37.
230. Id. at 1039.
231. Id. at 1038.
232 Id. at 1039.
233. Id.
234. Note that other grounds were invoked in the case. See supra note 220. See also the
discussion of health-health tradeoffs below in Section VI.B.5.
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"ceilings " to limit their own power; and the space between floors and
ceilings must not be too great. The implications of this new idea are
quite broad. The new doctrine could well be applied not only to EPA
decisions under the Clean Air Act, but to all EPA decisions, as well as
decisions from OSHA, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal
Communication Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commis
sion, and many more. At the same time, the court did not decide
whether to vacate the regulations, a topic that I take up below.

V.

EVALUATING THE NEW NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

Hard work will be needed to devise and secure the adoption of reconsti
tutive solutions to the central overload and political irresponsibility gen
erated by our prevailing reliance on command law. The energies of aca
demic lawyers . . . should be centered on this task, not on supposed
constitutional solutions that, in the end, can solve nothing.

5

-Richard Stewart23

[T]he nondelegation doctrine should be applied only as a second, per
haps last, resort. Initial consideration should be given to reading the
statutory authority of the agencies and the President more narrowly if
the language permits.

-Ernest Gellhom236

A.

1.

Is This a Nondelegation Doctrine at All?

The Appeal of the New Doctrine: Surrogate Safeguards

The new nondelegation doctrine has unquestionable appeal, and,
in one respect, it has long historic roots. To see why this is so, con
sider the posture of a court presented with a statute that may or may
not amount to an unconstitutional delegation. If the statute contains
open-ended terms, but also requires agencies to act only after fulfilling
elaborate procedural requirements, the nondelegation concern ap
pears to be diminished. As emphasized in Schechter Poultry, the pro
cedures serve as surrogate safeguards.
To be sure, procedural rights do not ensure that Congress will
make the fundamental value judgments; in this sense they do not pro
mote the key purpose of the doctrine. But if the nondelegation doc
trine is designed to promote rights of participation and accountability,
then a right to be heard, and to receive a public response to what is
said, can serve some of the goals of the doctrine. As we have seen,
this was part of the rationale on which the Court said, in Schechter

235. Stewart, supra note 172, at 343.
236. Gellhom, supra note 132, at 352.
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Poultry, that the Federal Radio Act and the Federal Trade Commis
sion Act were unobjectionable, despite their apparently broad
terms.237
It is not a terribly long step from this idea - of procedures as sur
rogate safeguards - to the notion that if administrators discipline
their own discretion through requirements laid down in advance, an
otherwise troubling delegation might be upheld - Judge Leventhal's
suggestion in Amalgamated Meat Cutters. While constrained adminis
trative discretion does not mean congressional lawmaking, it does tend
to promote predictability, consistency, and visibility in law, and to en
sure against ad hoc discretion by administrators, discretion that might
be exercised arbitrarily. This is the sense in which Amalgamated Meat
Cutters can be seen as of a piece with Schechter Poultry - with proce
dures and agency self-constraint operating, in the former case, as a
kind of "shield" against nondelegation doctrine attack.
The innovation in International Union and American Trucking is to
treat the notion of agency self-constraint not as a shield but as a sword
- to suggest that if an agency has not engaged in self-binding via
clear, articulable standards, the nondelegation doctrine has been vio
lated. An approach of this kind might well increase the consistency
and intelligibility of administrative policy, and it might make agency
decisions more reflective and even on balance better. As a matter of
policy analysis, American Trucking is quite sophisticated, and as we
will see, there is a great deal to be said for encouraging EPA to at
tempt more refined and (to the extent possible) quantitative assess
ments of severity of effects, likelihood of effects, and size of popula
tion exposed.238 Such an approach could well help in the development
of "floors" and "ceilings" for EPA judgment, and an understanding of
what counts as the legitimate "strike zone" could be a substantial im
provement in regulatory law.
2.

Problems

There are, however, serious problems here. Taken together, these
problems amount to decisive objections to the new nondelegation doc
trine.
(a) Administrative rather than legislative lawmaking. If a statute
creates a genuine nondelegation problem, why would an administra
tive construction eliminate it? The fundamental point of the nondele
gation doctrine is to ensure legislative rather than administrative
judgments about the content of federal law. It is odd to say that a

237. See supra Section III.A.
238. See infra Section VI.A.
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statute violates the nondelegation doctrine because of how it has been
construed by the relevant agency. It is one thing for a court, eager not
to overstep its constitutional role, to rescue a statute from nondelega
tion attack by saying that the agency has construed the statute in such
a way as to reduce risks of arbitrary judgment. It is another thing for a
court to invalidate a statute on nondelegation grounds with the
thought that the agency has failed to construe the statute with suffi
cient clarity. This idea converts the nondelegation doctrine into some
thing else altogether - a general requirement of administrative trans
parency, a requirement with no obvious constitutional foundation, and
certainly without foundation in Article I, the source of the nondelega
tion doctrine.
Perhaps the American
(b) Reinterpretation and discretion.
Trucking court's answer is that an agency interpretation can confine
administrative discretion, and in that way, at least, promote some of
the purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, rooted in rule-of-law
values, including transparency. But there is oddity here too. Under
Chevron,239 agencies are permitted to construe ambiguous statutory
terms, and no agency interpretation is set in stone. Supp ose that in
International Union - the lock-out/tag-out case - a future OSHA
accepted the court's explicit invitation and decided that cost-benefit
analysis would be the basis for regulatory judgments. Would this be
unlawful? Surely not.240 And if not - if the agency is entitled to
reinterpret the statute in its (reasoned) discretion - then how,
exactly, does one agency construction avoid a nondelegation problem?
Perhaps it does so because any agency construction makes the ba
sis for regulation visible to all, and in such a way as to constrain agency
choice unless and until a new interpretation has been issued publicly
and through the required channels. But this seems to be a pale echo
of the nondelegation principle. It is a pale echo, first, because it im
poses no requirements on Congress. It is a p ale echo, second, because
it does not bar agencies, over time, from construing open-ended statu
tory terms in radically different ways.241

239. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
240. This is because the OSHA statute would permit this interpretation. See Occupa
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
241. In response to the petition for rehearing en bane, the court of appeals said that
Chevron had superceded the Benzene Case, meaning that the proper response to a nondele
gation challenge is to obtain a narrow administrative interpretation of the statute. See
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, Nos. 97-1440, 97-1441, 1999 WL 979463, at *2 (D.C. Cir.
Oct. 29, 1999). The argument is ingenious but not responsive. If the statute is susceptible to
a narrowing construction, the agency should certainly provide that construction, and under
Chevron it is entitled to do so; but if it has not, this is the court's job, so as to save the stat
ute's validity if this is fairly possible.

352

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 98:303

(c) Institutional difficulties and very slippery slopes. There is also a
serious problem for the judicial role. Judge Leventhal used Davis'
idea as a basis for upholding a consensual arrangement between
Congress and the executive branch; the effort was to find a way to
validate the statute while also giving a signal to the executive. The
notion that open-ended statutes become unconstitutional unless
accompanied by agency specification would entail a far larger judicial
role.
Indeed, that role would extend far beyond the setting of
regulations of particulates and ozone. Consider the following:
• It would raise serious constitutional doubts about most and per
haps all of the rest of EPA's national primary and secondary
standards. None of those standards was issued with a clear
statement of the criteria that would mark the line between per
mitted and prohibited exposure levels.
• It could well raise questions about the activities of other agencies,
such as the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), that
operate pursuant to vague statutory terms; note that the FCC is
permitted to give out licenses in accordance with "public interest,
convenience, and necessity."242 What must the FCC say in order
to discipline the exercise of its own authority?
• It would raise constitutional questions about OSHA's use of the
"significant risk" idea. We have seen that in the Benzene Case,
the Court said that OSHA must show that any risk that it seeks to
regulate qualifies as "significant." No one seems to think that se
rious delegation issues are raised by the existence of administra
tive discretion to decide when a risk so qualifies, notwithstanding
the Supreme Court plurality's anticipation that this judgment
would be made administratively. But plainly it would not suffice
for an agency simply to announce that it deems a certain risk to
be significant. How can an agency distinguish between significant
and insignificant risks? Lower courts and OSHA have given
some guidance, but not a great deal; under the American Truck
ing ruling, this lack of statutory guidance raises serious constitu
tional problems unless agencies discipline their own discretion.243

242. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994).
243. The Benzene plurality's answer was a mix of the procedural and the substantive.
On the procedural side, there is a duty of reason-giving; the agency must explain in an
understandable way why it deems a certain risk significant. See Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). With respect to substance, the plurality
made a distinction: "[I]f the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhalation of gasoline
vapors that are 2% benzene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the risk
significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it." Id. at 655. At the same
time, the plurality said that a risk of one in a billion, from drinking a glass of water, could not
reasonably be considered significant.
Apart from recognizing the fact that judgments of significance will turn on "policy con
siderations," subsequent developments in the lower courts and in OSHA have left a high
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It would raise serious constitutional problems about statutes that
require agencies to engage in cost-benefit balancing, because
those statutes typically do not contain anything like an accompa
nying theory of valuation. Two especially prominent statutes the Toxic Substances Control Act244 and the Federal Insecticide,

degree of vagueness. To the extent that quantitative judgments have been made, they take
the form of a "strike zone" within which the agency can operate - a domain that marks out
floors and ceilings. For example, OSHA believes that a working lifetime risk of death of
over 1.64/1,900 from occupational causes is "significant." See Building & Constrs. Trades
Dep't v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This means that if a worker faces a
1.64/1,000 risk of death if he is exposed, for all of his working life, to gasoline vapors that are
2% benzene, that worker is facing a significant risk. The agency has expressly concluded
that the significant risk standard is satisfied by a risk of 1.64 excess mesothelioma deaths per
thousand. See id. at 1265. At the same time, the agency has said that a risk of 0.6 in 100,000
"may be approaching a level that can be viewed as safe," Occupational Exposure to Formal
dehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46, 168, 46,234 (1987), a qualified statement that, in context, suggests
that a risk of 6 in one million would not be regarded as significant. Conclusions of this kind
are certainly better than nothing at all, but they leave many open questions. What if the
relevant risk involving injuries and illnesses rather than fatalities, or some combination of
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities? Some version of the "quality-adjusted life years" idea
would seem necessary to allow meaningful comparison of, say, a risk of 1/10,000 of death
alongside a risk of 1/500 of serious respiratory problems.
In addition, OSHA seems to consider the risk for workers subject to lifetime exposure, a
number that seems vulnerable for two reasons. First, there are cases where lifetime expo
sure is rare; what if, say, only 10% of the exposed population is exposed for all of a working
life, and 50% is exposed for a period of ten years or less? Shouldn't this be taken into ac
count in considering the significance of the risk? Second and more fundamentally: The size
of the exposed population would seem to matter. See HAMILTON & V1scus1, supra note 63,
at 91-108. Suppose, for example, that the relevant risk is 1/1,000, but that only 500 people
are exposed to the risk; is this the same case, in terms of significance, as one in which the
relevant risk is 1/1,000, and 2 million workers are exposed to the risk? Perhaps it is; perhaps
the agency believes that no one should be exposed to a 1/1,000 risk of death. This is not an
entirely implausible judgment. Even so, what if the risk is 6 in one million, but twenty mil
lion workers are in the exposed population? By hypothesis, 120 workers will die as a result
of the hazard. Is this so clearly insignificant?

The point can be made more vividly by revisiting the Supreme Court's suggestion that a
one in one billion risk of death from having a risk of chlorinated water "clearly could not be
considered significant." Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 655. Suppose that every American
drinks five glasses of water a day; suppose, too, that there are 250 million Americans. If
Americans drink 1.25 billion glasses of water each day, then 1.25 Americans will contract a
fatal illness each day, which is to say that 456 Americans will contract a fatal illness each year
from drinking water. Is it so clear that the relevant risk is insignificant? Or that a govern
ment agency is disabled from reaching that conclusion? A possible reaction to these prob
lems is that it is extremely artificial to assess the significance of a risk without also assessing
the cost of eliminating it. If the chlorinated water risk just discussed could be eliminated at a
cost of $10,000, it should by all means be eliminated; things are different if the cost would
run to many billions of dollars. But as construed by the court, OSHA forbids cost-benefit
balancing. Hence the agency must make a risk-only determination. We can imagine a range
of sensible judgments - for example, from 1/1,000 as a presumptively significant risk to
1/100,000 as a presumptively insignificant risk (both rebuttable depending on the size of the
population); or an approach based on quality-adjusted life years ("QALYs") - for example,
considering a savings of over 50 QALYs per year a presumptively sufficient basis for regula
tion. See infra Section VI.A.4 for a discussion of QALYs.
244. 15 u.s.c. § 2601-2692.
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Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act245 - require the agency to regu
late "unreasonable risks," a term that clearly contemplates some
form of cost-benefit balancing. All such statutes raise obvious
questions. Should a life be valued at $500,000 or $10 million?
What about a respiratory illness? And what is the appropriate
discount rate for lives saved and illnesses averted (say) twenty
years from now?246 Congress has made no effort to answer these
questions.247 Are such measures unconstitutional unless and until
the agency has come up with a consistent method of valuation?
Some observers have suggested that cost-benefit balancing would
be a way to avoid the constitutional problems recognized in
American Trucking.248 But under the logic of the case, a cost
benefit requirement unaccompanied by some kind of quantifica
tion would be unconstitutional unless and until an agency disci
plines itself with clear valuation criteria. This would be an ex
travagant conclusion.
• It would raise questions about much other BPA activity as well.
Consider the statute governing the calculation of natural resource
damages, where Congress simply refers to factors that BPA must
consider, without making them exclusive or giving them a speci
fied weight.249 Is this statute therefore unconstitutional? Until
the agency has undertaken the job of weighting?

245. 7 u.s.c. § l36-136y.
246. On the centrality of this question, see Heinzerling, supra note 8, at 2017-2024, and
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of
Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943-47 {1999).
247. Legislative silence raises many questions. One is positive: Why has Congress ef
fectively delegated the central issues to the executive branch? Part of the answer lies in the
incentives faced by individual legislators. See EPSTEIN & O'HALLORAN, supra note 166, at
196-206; Aranson et al., supra note 166, at 43-45. For a member of Congress, an insistence
on cost-benefit analysis is likely to please relevant constituencies concerned about excessive
or irrational legislation. But a judgment about valuation - suggesting, for example, that a
statistical life is worth $2 million - is likely to be exceedingly controversial, a kind of recipe
for campaign advertisements by political opponents. In most cases, individual members
have far more to lose than to gain from specificity. But this is only part of the explanation.
In a sense, people engage in cost-benefit analysis all the time; they decide whether to pur
chase a Volvo, or to have a smoke alarm, or to live in the city, or to walk across the street at
night. But ordinary people are highly resistant to explicit cost-benefit analysis; they do not
believe, for example, that they are assigning a price to their child's (statistical?) life when
they decide whether to put their child in the backseat of the car. There is a kind of moral
taboo against explicit cost-benefit analysis, at least with respect to people's lives. The moral
taboo may be a form of irrationality; or it may be a kind of overgeneralization of othenvise
sound (or at least salutary) moral intuitions. In any case it should not be surprising to find
that law is based on those moral intuitions. Very predictably, elected officials will sometimes
require cost-benefit balancing, but they will leave questions of valuation to bureaucrats.
248. See, e.g., Lutter & DeMuth, supra note 8, at 3.
249. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1994).
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(d) Alternatives. Perhaps it would be necessary to consider radical
steps if there were no alternative to the new nondelegation doctrine.
But ordinary judicial review, suitably adapted to this context, offers
some promising approaches, as we will soon see. And in the extreme
cases, the old nondelegation doctrine would be the best route to fol
low. In fact International Union was the strongest case within memory
for judicial invalidation of a statute on nondelegation grounds. The
"reasonably necessary or appropriate" language offered almost no
guidance at all, and unlike in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, there was, in
the statute's background, no context that could have disciplined the
discretion of the agency. If the court had sought to avoid constitu
tional doubts, International Union might have been the occasion, not
for an invitation to the agency to choose an interpretation of its liking,
but for an authoritative judicial interpretation requiring OSHA to en
gage in cost-benefit balancing. The court might have so concluded on
the ground that "reasonably necessary or appropriate" is far more of a
balancing provision than the more specific toxic substance provision,
and on the further ground that an interpretation to this effect would
have had the advantage of preventing the agency from having the dis
cretion to choose from one of a large number of interpretations of the
Act. Certainly this approach seems preferable to a remand to the
agency on nondelegation grounds. And as we will see, judicial efforts
to require quantification - express identification of risk levels - and
to elicit relevant value judgments could accomplish most of the goals
of the new nondelegation doctrine without bringing out constitutional
artillery at all.
Indeed there is a large puzzle at the heart of American Trucking:
Why didn't the court simply construe the Act so as to create floors and
ceilings, and then hold that BPA's decision was not adequately justi
fied, and therefore must be remanded, because of the failure to ex
plain why one level rather than another had been chosen? The most
plausible answer is that the court sought not simply to invalidate an
inadequately explained regulation, but to send the agency a stronger
and more global signal, to the effect that any regulation must be de
fended, on pain of constitutional invalidity, by reference to a close,
quantitative explanation of why it is superior to the alternative. But as
a constitutional doctrine, this seems implausible. Congress frequently
asks agencies to consider a set of factors.250 Is agency action pursuant

250. See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, §
4(b)(l), '01 Stat. 627, 629-30 (1973) (omitted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 760(g) (1994)) (empha
sizing that "to the maximum extent practicable," the agency should "provide for" no fewer
than eight factors, including protection of public health, economic efficiency, maintenance of
exploration and production of fuels, equitable distribution of crude oil and petroleum prod
ucts, and many more). (The statute is discussed as typical in KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (3d ed. 1994).) See also,
e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
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to such statutes violative of the Constitution until the agency has
turned the factors into something like a rule? That would be an im
plausible conclusion.
B.

The Place ofthe Nondelegation Doctrine in Administrative Law

None of this means that the nondelegation doctrine deserves no
place in administrative law. Indeed, some of the arguments thus far
suggest a far from trivial role for the doctrine.

1.

Invalidations in Extreme Cases

In the most extreme cases, open-ended grants of authority should
be invalidated. Schechter Poultry was rightly decided, for the statute
did not discipline executive authority, and indeed it operated as a
grant of lawmaking power to private groups. And it would not have
been at all implausible to conclude, in International Union, that if
Congress is asking a regulatory agency to reduce occupational risks, it
should say something other than that standards should be "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" to promote statutory goals. In fact the
OSHA statute - outside of the area of toxic substances, where Con
gress added relevant detail251 - was a good candidate for invalidation
on nondelegation grounds.
A Supreme Court decision to this effect could have some of the
salutary effects of the Lopez252 decision in the Commerce Clause area,
offering a signal to Congress that it is important to think with some
particularity about the standards governing agency behavior. There
should not be many such cases; but an occasional signal is highly desir
able. It follows that if the Clean Air Act did indeed authorize EPA to
"pick any point between zero and a hair below . . . London's Killer
Fog," the Court would have been right to say that it was invalid. The
problem was that this was an implausible construction of the Act.253

("CERCLA") of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(4)(A)-(G) (1994) (listing seven factors as basis
for presidential assessment of whether to provide a covenant not to sue); 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)
(providing, as guidelines for regulations determining natural resource damages, that the
President should "identify the best available procedures
and shall take into consideration
factors including, but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosys
tem to recover").
• • .

251. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994) (re
ferring, inter alia, to requirement that regulations must be "feasible").
252. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
253. See infra Section V.C.
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Statutory Construction

In other cases, the nondelegation doctrine is an appropriate tool of
construction: As between an open-ended and less open-ended under
standing of agency authority, the less open-ended interpretation
should be preferred. The most famous example is Kent v. Dulles,254
where the Court narrowed a seemingly broad grant of authority to the
Secretary of State, thus forbidding him to refuse a passport to a mem
ber of the Communist Party. As we will shortly see, the nondelegation
doctrine is part of what justifies a narrowing construction of the Clean
Air Act, one that gives the agency limited room to maneuver.255
Indeed, many statutes are sensibly construed to limit agency dis
cretion, even if their terms are broad, when the context reasonably
suggests that the agency is not permitted to do whatever it wishes.
Consider, for example, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters case. As I have
suggested, the best approach there would have involved a recognition
that the statute was designed to meet the perceived problem of "cost
push" inflation. Congress hardly meant to give the President the
authority to set wages and prices however he chose. This would be a
truly bizarre reading of the statute, taken in context.256 The President
should be required to justify any wage and price freezes in statutorily
relevant terms, a requirement that should go a long way toward allevi
ating the underlying concerns, which had to do with political favorit
ism. This is the conventional approach to the Federal Trade Commis
sion Act257 (banning unfair trade practices258) and (with a little more
difficulty) to the Federal Communications Act,259 whose key terms
("public interest, convenience, and necessity") are not understood to
allow the FCC to give and deny licenses on whatever terms it likes.260

3.

Democracy-Promoting Minimalism: Clear Statement Principles as
Nondelegation Canons

Perhaps most important, the nondelegation doctrine is alive and
well, but it operates under another name: "clear statement" princi-

254. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
255. See infra Section V.C.
256. Compare the delegation to Hitler; this was a genuine effort to allow Hitler to rule
in his discretion. See CURRIE, supra note 131, at 125-27.
257. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
258. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532 (1935).
259. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1994).
260. See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Central
Florida Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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pies, or what we might understand as "nondelegation canons," occu
pying the contemporary position of the old nondelegation doctrine.261
Often courts say that statutes will not be interpreted to allow agen
cies to engage in certain conduct unless there has been a clear state
ment of authorization from Congress. For example, it seems to be
clear that agencies cannot apply statutes extraterritorially without an
express legislative decision to that effect, and courts will not under
stand statutes to raise serious constitutional questions until Congress
has made clear its intention to do so; so too, statutes are not lightly
taken to preempt state law.262 These ideas are best understood as nar
rower and more targeted versions of the nondelegation doctrine. Un
like the standard version of that doctrine, they do not say that Con
gress must legislate clearly; they do not result in the invalidation of
any statute. But they do say that agencies will not be able to move
statutes in certain contested directions on their own. Only a deliber
ate and specific decision from the national legislature will suffice. By
requiring Congress to legislate with particularity on certain topics,
clear statement principles serve the same function as the nondelega
tion doctrine. And they do so with respect to subjects that particularly
seem to call for legislative rather than executive judgments.
There is a further point.
The nondelegation canons require
congressional lawmaking, and in that sense they are connect�d with
Article I goals, but they pose far less serious risks than the old
doctrine. Where the old doctrine runs into serious institutional
problems, partly because of the difficulty of drawing principled lines
between too much and too little delegation, the nondelegation canons
are quite simple to apply. Because these canons do not require courts
to decide har.d questions of degree, and apply in a restricted domain,
they impose far less strain on the judicial role. And where the old
doctrine might be criticized as a potential source of danger to the
fabric of national institutions (by, for example, drawing too many
statutes into constitutional doubt), the nondelegation canons pose no
such risk. They do not require general clarity from Congress; they
mean only that where sensitive rights or interests are involved,
Congress, rather than agencies, must make the central choices.
It is especially striking that these "little" nondelegation principles
trump agency interpretations of law, even in the post-Chevron era, in
which agencies receive a high degree of law-interpreting power.263

261. See generally Sunstein, supra note 23.
262 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (extraterritoriality);
Muscogee Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (construction in favor of Native
Americans); see also WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
323-28 (1994) (citing numerous canons of statutory construction).
263. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923 (1995) (refusing to defer to agency
interpretation because of constitutional doubts); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
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Agency interpretations of ambiguous provisions do not prevail in the
face of a clear statement principle, whose point is to ensure congres
sional rather than merely executive deliberation on the question at
hand. Thus understood, the clear statement principles are a paradig
matic form of "democracy-promoting minimalism." They reflect a
cautious judicial role, one that does not preempt democratic processes
but instead attempts to fortify them, by ensuring that certain sensitive
questions receive explicit and sustained attention from the national
legislature.
C.

Why the Clean Air Act Is Constitutional (and What It Means)

All this helps identify the basic question that must be answered in
order to decide whether the Clean Air Act is constitutional: Does the
Act authorize EPA to set standards at whatever level it wishes? Or
does it set ceilings and floors? If ceilings and floors are in place, and if
there is not too much room between them, then agency discretion is
sufficiently constrained.
In answering this question, courts appropriately do whatever might
reasonably be done to avoid invalidating the Act - a natural applica
tion of the general idea that whenever possible, statutes should be
construed so as to be constitutional.264 The central issue is therefore
one of statutory construction. In fact it is entirely possible to generate
an interpretation of the statute that survives constitutional scrutiny.
The most reasonable interpretation is that EPA's health-based judg
ment (a) cannot call for regulation of small or trivial risks (such regu
lation would not be "requisite to protect the public health"), and (b)
must call for regulation of risks that are serious and substantial. Thus
if the residual risk of a pollutant is trivial or de minimis - if, for ex
ample, the risk involves minor respiratory problems but no more than
that - then EPA is not obligated or even permitted to regulate it. In
deed, EPA regulation of a trivial or de minimis risk should be held
unlawful, on the ground that such regulation is not requisite to protect
the public health, even with an adequate margin of safety. If EPA
seeks to reduce exposure to ground-level ozone below a level that al
ready ensures protection against all serious risks faced by Americans,

Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76 (1988) (same); Williams v.
Babbitt, 115 F3d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Boston and Me. Corp. v. ICC, 911 F.2d 743
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (same).
264. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958). For a similar sentiment from
an enthusiast for the nondelegation doctrine, see Gellhorn, supra note 132, at 352 ("[T]he
nondelegation doctrine should be applied only as a second, perhaps last, resort. Initial
consideration should be given to reading the statutory authority of the agencies and the
President more narrowly if the language permits.").
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it is acting unlawfully.265 On the other hand, EPA is required (not
merely permitted) to regulate any substantial or significant risk. If, for
example, 10,000 people or 1,000 are likely to die each year as a result
of exposure to a certain level of lead, EPA must act; it is not author
ized to allow that level of risk.
These points go a long way toward creating floors and ceilings and
resolving the polar cases. Suppose, for example, that existing evidence
shows significant increased mortality risks for ordinary people from
sulfur dioxide at levels above 0.8 ppm, and increased hospital admis
sions at levels about 0.6 ppm, but no mortality risk from sulfur dioxide
levels below 0.7 ppm, and no increase in hospital admissions below 0.4
ppm - and also that there is chronic plant injury at 0.1 ppm, and that
respiratory problems increase among a small, sensitive subpopulation
at 0.15 ppm. On the facts as stated, EPA's discretion is confined. It
could not issue a primary standard above 0.6 ppm or so, and it could
not issue a standard below 0.5 ppm or so - unless it could make ex
trapolations from the evidence that would suggest a substantial risk at
lower levels. Of course this is a stylized and artificial example, and of
ten the evidence will allow a range of reasonable judgments. But that
is a product of the uncertain science, not of any constitutional defect in
the statute. Indeed, EPA itself has asserted that on the evidence, it
was statutorily required to set the ozone standard somewhere between
0.07 ppm and 0.09 ppm - a statement that, if true, is decisive on the
nondelegation question.
The approach I am suggesting - one that would understand the
Act to create ceilings and floors - raises several questions of its own.
It might be asked how the Act supports a distinction between trivial
and significant risks; isn't this an invention of interpretation, rather
than a legitimate reading of the Act? To be sure, the Act does not ex
plicitly make such a distinction, but an interpretation to this effect is
far from unnatural and indeed a good deal more compelling than the
plurality's similar interpretation of the OSHA Act in the Benzene
Case.266 Surely such an interpretation should be favored if it is neces
sary to prevent the Act from being a blank check to EPA.

265. Indeed there is a reasonable argument that this was the case for the ozone regula
tion at issue in American Trucking. See supra Section 11.B.
266. The basic problem for the plurality in that case is that there was no statutory source
for the "significant risk" requirement in the OSHA Act. This was a judicial invention,
designed to make sense rather than nonsense of the law. See Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980). By contrast, the Clean Air Act's
requirement of standards that are "requisite to protect the public health" and based on the
underlying scientific "criteria document" is quite naturally understood as a requirement that
the agency ban only serious risks. Of course the American Trucking court's concern was
"how serious is serious?" - a legitimate question, but one best handled via conventional
judicial review, as explained below in Section VI.B.
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It might also be objected that this interpretation continues to allow
EPA a large deal of discretion; isn't the statute unconstitutional even
as construed, at least unless and until EPA can give more specificity to
notions like "substantial" and "trivial"? The answer is that it is not.
The most important precedent here is the Benzene Case itself. The
OSHA statute, as construed by the Supreme Court, requires the
agency to regulate "significant" risks to the point of "feasibility," and
neither term is defined in the statute. This does not mean that the
statute is unconstitutional until OSHA particularizes those terms.
What it does mean is that any agency decision is subject to invalida
tion on grounds of arbitrariness if the agency has not adequately ex
plained itself. The upshot: This, not delegation, was the fundamental
problem in American Trucking.
My basic conclusion is that the nondelegation doctrine should be
used only in the most extreme cases; that the Clean Air Act is not such
a case; that the doctrine properly plays a role as a tool of statutory
construction, emphatically with the Clean Air Act; and that the work
done by the American Trucking court under the rubric of the nondele
gation doctrine is far more reasonably done under review of agency
action for arbitrariness. It is now time to turn to the questions that
remain - questions that are not constitutional in status, but that are
extremely important nonetheless.

VI.

OPTIONS, F'uTuRES, AND CLEAN AIR

[A]n agency wielding the power over American life possessed by EPA
should be capable of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit of
harm that takes into account population affected, severity and probabil
ity.

-American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA261

At the rate of progress permitted by . . . judicial decisions, the EPA and
OSHA could not possibly perform their statutorily assigned missions
through use of rulemaking in less than several centuries.

268
-Richard J. Pierce, Jr.

This Part discusses some aspects of the future of environmental
law. An overview: What I have been calling "1970s environmental
ism" refers to an approach to environmental protection that (a) sought
"safe" levels of pollution, (b) favored command-and-control regula
tion, (c) devoted little attention to priority-setting, and (d) seemed

267. 175 F.3d 1027, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
268. Pierce, supra note 83, at 61.
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oblivious to tradeoffs.269 As we have seen, this approach accomplished
a great deal.270 But it is far too crude to provide a promising model for
the future. A new approach - what appears to be a "second wave" of
environmental reform, now in progress - would call for (a) economic
incentives as a presumptive substitute for command-and-control, (b)
some form of cost-benefit balancing, (c) attention to the "health
health tradeoffs" sometimes involved in environmental regulation,
and (d) recognition that safety is a matter of degree, alongside guid
ance for deciding when a certain level of pollution is unacceptably
high. This is not the place for a full discussion of such reforms; but in
the closing parts of this Section, I outline the ingredients of this "sec
ond wave" approach.271
At a minimum - and this is my principal claim here - EPA
should take steps toward greater quantification of risks associated with
various pollution levels, and at the same time consider alternatives in
some detail. A primary goal of this approach would be to produce a
long overdue "common law" of environmental protection - devel
oped in the first instance by EPA and designed to promote a measure
of coherence and interregulation consistency, and to ensure that
regulations are not legitimately challenged as unduly lenient or unduly
strict. It is appropriate for courts to require EPA to do this as part of
judicial review for arbitrariness. But because judicial review itself
threatens to have unfortunate systemic effects, above all by freezing
the status quo, courts should continue current experiments with the
idea of "remand without invalidation." Thus I suggest that the appro
priate approach to the American Trucking case would be a remand to
EPA for the required "benefits analysis," but a remand unaccompa
nied by invalidation.

269. See BREYER, supra note 5; GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 5, at 378-448;
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND S OCIAL JUSTICE 245-381 {1997); Richard B. Stew
art, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 97-114 {1986).
270. See supra Section II.C.
271. Still more ambitious reforms - perhaps a "third wave," now at its inception would place a greater emphasis on negotiated solutions, on "environmental contracting," see
SUNSTEIN, supra note 269, at 363, and on cooperative approaches, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM
& RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REFORMING WORKPLACE SAFETY: SYSTEM AND SANCTIONS
{1999); Tinlothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regula
tory Theory, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 482-503 {1995). It would also attempt to relieve
the informational burden on centralized institutions, enlisting private groups in the determi
nation of what approaches make best sense. See Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard En
vironmentalism, BOSTON REV., Oct./Nov. 1999, at 4, 5. Efforts at producing voluntary self
regulation, and provision of information, would play a central role here. See GUNNINGHAM
& GRABOSKY, supra note 5, at 378-448; Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest,
CAL L. REV. {forthcoming 2000). Of course a full discussion of reforms of this sort would
go well beyond the scope of the present discussion.
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A Twenty-first Century EPA: Ceilings, Floors, and
"Benefits Analysis"

1.

The Problem

I have emphasized that notwithstanding its commendable detail
about the underlying evidence, EPA's explanation of its rule leaves
much to be desired. This is not uncommon for agency explanations in
the area of safety and health; similar problems can be found in the
OSHA context and also in EPA action under other statutes.272 The
agency's extensive discussion is abstract and conclusory on the key
p oints.273 It does provide evidence that ozone and p articulates can
have adverse effects at current levels. But it does not give a suffi
ciently clear sense of the extent of those adverse effects, nor does it
explain why the particular, selected regulation was optimally suited to
new information about health effects. The most informative docu
ment is the agency's regulatory impact analysis, which could be used
as the basis for a simple statement of the anticipated benefits of in
creased regulation at various levels.
The resulting problems have both technocratic and democratic di
mensions. Without sp ecification of the range of benefits to be antici
pated from various approaches, there is a weak role for sound science
in standard-setting. The best that science can do is to give a range of
likely health and welfare gains from alternative initiatives, and the
prop er role of technocratic factors cannot be served if EPA sp eaks in
vague, conclusory, or wholly qualitative terms. What is necessary is to
have some sense of the magnitude of gains from competing ap 
proaches. From the democratic p oint of view, what is missing is an
opp ortunity for the public, first, to have a sense of those gains, and
second, to be able to receive an account of why the government has
chosen one set of gains rather than another. Any p articular choice re
flects an imp ortant social judgment; officials should be clear about the
values that underlie that choice.

272 See Co"osion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (1991), where the court rightly
found a number of unanswered objections to an agency rule banning asbestos - a rule that
probably would have produced far more gain than harm on balance. (The agency reasona
bly concluded that the rule would have saved well over 300 lives per year at a reasonable
overall cost.) The court's decision eliminated the asbestos regulation, a ten-year effort, and
seems in the process to have brought EPA's rulemaking efforts under the Toxic Substances
Control Act to a complete halt. Cf. MASHAw & liARFST, supra note 207 (finding similar
systemic effects of judicial review). A possible answer to this problem would have been for
the court to remand without vacating the rule. See infra Section VI.B.
273. See generally supra Section II.D.
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Toward Benefits Analysis

By way of response, I suggest that in issuing national ambient air
quality standards, BPA should endeavor to provide a detailed "bene
fits analysis," designed to strengthen both technocratic and democratic
forces. In order to improve the role of science, the benefits analysis
should attempt to describe, in both qualitative and quantitative terms,
the various savings from the selected regulation and at least two rea
sonable alternatives, one more stringent, the other less so. This is an
effort to strengthen the role of technocratic forces by ensuring that
BPA is acting pursuant to a clear understanding of the health and wel
fare effects of reasonable options. In the process BPA should identify
the residual risk left, under alternative approaches, by the pollutant in
question and explain why that residual risk is not above the level
"requisite to protect the public health." EPA should thus take steps to
identify the size of the population affected, the severity of the various
risks, and the likelihood that members of any particular group will suf
fer the relevant effects. To the extent possible, it should attempt to
quantify each of these items.274 It might say, for example, that forty
million people are at risk, that ten million of these people are under
the age of eighteen, that five million are over the age of sixty, that
there is a 1/1,000 chance of cancer as a result of exposure, and that the
relevant risks range from respiratory problems to hospitalization and
missed work-days to cancer.275
BPA should also explain why one set of savings, thus quantified,
justifies regulation, whereas other sets of savings do not. Here there is
an inevitable judgment of value, and no purely technocratic exercise.
BPA might conclude, for example, that one approach leaves an exces
sive risk to health, because it would result in between 500 and 1,500
annual deaths as compared with the chosen approach - whereas an
other initiative would go beyond the level required to protect the pub
lic health, because it would result in between 0 and 100 annual deaths,
most of them involving the elderly (and this a small extension of life).
This is an effort to strengthen democratic forces in regulation, by en
suring that the relevant value judgment is made publicly and exposed
to democratic view.
BPA should also attempt to reduce its own discretion by showing
that at least as a presumption, risks above a certain level will not be

274. An argument against quantification is provided in Heinzerling, supra note 8, at
2042-69. Even if we accept Heinzerling's argument against the form of monetizing quantifi
cation that is embodied in cost-benefit analysis, it is far from clear that the argument has
weight against an attempt to quantify (rather than to monetize) benefits. For an argument in
favor of both qualitative and quantitative presentations, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and
Cost-Benefit Analysis, J. LEGALSTUD. (forthcoming 2000).
275. These risks might all be quantified. See infra app. tbl.2.
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tolerated ("risk ceilings") and that risks below a certain level will be
acceptable ("risk floors"). It should, in short, explain why a standard
for ozone of 0.08 is to be preferred to a standard of 0.09 or 0.07, and
do so by reference to generalizable criteria. If - as seems clear - the
risks prevented by the new ozone regulation are far smaller than the
risks that would be prevented by more stringent regulation of par
ticulates, EPA should explain the apparent anomaly in terms of statu
torily relevant factors. A chief advantage of this approach is that it
should ensure interregulation consistency, in such a way as to combat,
simultaneously, interest-group power, public torpor, and public over
reaction with respect to certain pollutants. I return to this point
shortly.276

3.

Difficulties, Uncertainty, Contentio� Assumptions

A proposal of this kind raises several problems. An obvious diffi
culty is connected with specifying the set of alternatives. Any agency
could "frame" the alternatives so as to make its own choice seem plau
sible, even inevitable. In the context of ozone, for example, the choice
of 0.08 would have seemed entirely reasonable if EPA had compared
that option to 0.12 (worse on health grounds) and 0.04 (regulating ap
parently trivial risks). Thus it is necessary to ensure that the alterna
tives be reasonable ones - that they be within the domain, or "strike
zone," indicated by the scientific evidence.zn The CASAC recom
mendations provide a great deal of help here. They specify the range
of options that experts consider plausible, and if EPA compares its
choice to both more and less stringent alternatives within the ap
proximate domain suggested by CASAC, the problem of "framing"
should be adequately addressed.
Of course any analysis of expected benefits will depend on conten
tious assumptions. The most serious problem here is that in many
cases, scientific uncertainty will confound any attempt to quantify with
precision. In these circumstances EPA's real question is one of timing:
Does it act now, or does it wait until the scientific information pro
vides more clarity with respect to health effects? Inaction would cre
ate potential problems, possibly even a significant number of prevent
able deaths; but action could create problems too, in the form of high
costs for trivial health benefits. This is certainly a plausible reading of
the situation with respect to both particulates and (especially) ozone;
in both cases we do not know enough to assign specific numbers to dif
ferent exposure levels. When existing evidence does not justify any
particular number, then EPA should do the best that it can to specify a

276. See infra text accompanying note 281.
277. See supra note 243.
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reasonable range.278 But scientific uncertainty is not the only problem.
A projection of benefits must depend on a baseline about what would
have happened without regulation, and (if converted into dollars)
might also require use of the contingent valuation method, for which
estimates are highly vulnerable to manipulation, depending on the na
ture of the particular questions asked.279 Perhaps most important, the
estimate of benefits in dollars will tum partly on the discount rate for
future savings; a discount rate of 8% will produce very different num
bers from a discount rate of 2%.280 In these circumstances, the bene
fits analysis should be clear about the assumptions chosen, and should
indicate the range of benefits and the numbers that would emerge
from different assumptions.
In terms of intergovernmental design, it makes sense to ensure that
the analysis of the rule, and the alternatives to the rule, are developed
in conjunction with another institution in the executive branch, such as
the Office of Management and Budget, which already plays a role of
this sort under Executive Order 12,866.281 The purpose of intergov
ernmental review of this kind would be to ensure a form of internal
"peer review," designed to overcome possible biases and errors on the
part of any particular bureaucracy. An external check is well suited to
accomplishing this goal.

4.

An Analogy: From Health to the Environment

A possible approach to the evaluation of benefits comes from the
health field, where much attention has focused on evaluating prefer
ences for healthy conditions (or aversion to unhealthy ones) in terms
of what are called quality-adjusted life years ("QALYs").282 A QALY
is a measure of health based on people's attitudes toward various con
ditions. It rejects the concept of monetary evaluation of health; in
stead, it focuses on how people value various health states. It seeks to
generate a means of comparing various states of health !hrough a sin
gle metric, so that comparisons and tradeoffs can be made for public
policy purposes. The measure attempts to take into account both
quantitative benefits of health improvement, such as increase in life
expectancy, and more qualitative improvements, such as quality-of-life
benefits .

278. See infra app. for examples, taken from the RIA.
279. See Lutter & Demuth, supra note 8, at 6-10.
280. See Heinzerling, supra note 8, at 2018.
281. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. {1993 compilation) 638 {1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C A § 601 {1996).
.

.

282. The measure was first described in Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where
Now for Saving Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 {1976).
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The QALY approach works by asking people through interview
techniques to express their strength of preference for various health
states. The most advanced methods disaggregate the process by ask
ing people to describe how they would value a health improvement
along several dimensions: mobility, physical activity, social activity,
and the kinds of symptom effects involved.283 The answers to these
questions are combined into a single scale, ranked 0 (for death) to 1.0
(for optimum functioning). The result is an index of utility for health
states measured on an interval (or cardinal) scale. By independently
determining the cost of various treatments and their likely outcomes,
researchers can suggest a cost per QALY of various public programs.
Alternative programs can be ranked in what is essentially a utility
based cost-effectiveness scale.284
In the context of the Clean Air Act, it makes little sense to engage
in surveys about how people rank various health risks. In the govern
ing RIA, EPA has already attempted to measure both benefits and
willingness to pay for reductions of various risks,285 and it could easily
adapt these figures to generate numbers for overall risk reductions,
defined in terms of some overall measure, perhaps that of quality
adjusted life years. Lives saved might, for example, be converted into
a life-years saved number, and to this EPA could add various numbers
representing the other health gains to be brought about by the regula
tion. The approach to particulates might be compared to, and squared
with, the approach to ozone, and these approaches might also be ra
tionalized with existing regulation of lead, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, and carbon monoxide.286

5.

Toward a (New) Common Law ofRegulatory Protection

Through such a route EPA could begin to develop what it should
have provided at least a decade ago: a common law of public health
protection. This would reflect a system of judgments indicating when

283. An important work in the development of these multidimensional measures is
Robert M. Kaplan & James W. Bush, Health-Related Quality for Life Measurement of
Evaluation Research and Policy Analysis, 1 HEALTH PSYCH. 61, 68-69 (1982). For a general
survey of QALY approaches, see George W. Torrance, Measurement ofHealth State Utilities
for Economic Appraisal: A Review, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 1 (1986). For a more recent general
discussion, see Robert Fabian, The Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY:
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 118 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994).
284. An important advantage of the QALY method is that it eliminates the distribution
of-income problems of other methods. The QALY approach rests on a strict egalitarian
premise; the value of various states of health should be independent of the economic status
of the particular people in those states.
285. See infra app. As mentioned above, the tables in the appendix are taken from in
formation in the RIA.
286. See infra app.
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a given set of harms is sufficient to trigger additional regulation, and
also when a set of harms is too trivial to count as a legally cognizable
public health problem. And eventually it should be possible to have
quite disaggregated data, showing the geographical areas in which
health problems are most concentrated. For example, the health risks
of lead were concentrated in the inner city;287 the same may well be
true of particulates. If this is so, a careful "benefits analysis" could
pave the way toward an understanding of where regulatory activity
would accomplish the most good, in a way that would diminish some
of the problems associated with a nationally uniform policy. Such an
approach could also help to invigorate local processes for environ
mental protection, so as to allow a higher degree of coordination be
tween the national government and states and localities.288
This final point raises a general question about the content of any
such common law: the status, for purposes of law and policy, of inter
regulation inconsistency. Suppose, for example, that EPA leaves a
much higher residual risk for particulates than for ozone, as indeed it
plainly appears to have done here.289 Is this indefensible, or even un
lawful? As we have seen, one of the virtues of the approach suggested
here is that it attempts to promote consistency in the rulemaking proc
ess, in such a way as to reduce the power of well-organized private
groups. It might seem to follow that if BPA allows a much higher re
sidual risk for one substance than for another, it should be vulnerable
on judicial review; and so too if it allows a much lower residual risk for
a particular pollutant. This does indeed follow. The question is
whether BPA can defend apparent interregulation inconsistency in
statutorily relevant terms (as, for example, by showing that children
are at particular risk from one or another problem). If it cannot, it has
acted unlawfully.
There is a still broader point in the background here. The case for
clear standards is strongest in a "mass justice" situation - a context in
which an agency must decide a wide range of cases. In such situations,
standardlessness is unacceptable - it creates a recipe for abuse, pro
ducing unequal treatment of the similarly situated.290 When an agency
is making a one-shot decision, or two or three decisions, the argument
for binding standards is less insistent. The point helps explain the de
cision of the court of appeals in American Trucking, where two regula
tions were before the court, not easily reconciled with one another,
and where many years of NAAQS decisions made the situation re-

287. See MELNICK, supra note 63, at 267, 276.
288. See Sabel et al., supra note 271.
289. See infra app.
290. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
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semble more closely a "mass justice" problem. In these circumstances,
the proposal for "benefits analysis" is designed to ensure a set of rela
tively uniform and transparent standards, more suitable to the future
of environmental protection, where the whole area will achieve a de
gree of maturity. The development of a common law of regulatory
protection, generated in the first instance by agencies rather than
judges, would be a crucial step in this endeavor.
B.

Ordinary (Not Extraordinary) Judicial Review: Democracy
Promoting Minimalism in Practice

As I have suggested, conventional judicial review could have ac
commodated the American Trucking court's reasonable concerns.291
In order to explore how democracy-promoting minimalism might
work, I suggest here that the appropriate approach would be to hold
both regulations invalid on the ground that the agency did not ade
quately explain its choice of the particular levels that it prescribed.
The most serious problem with this approach is that it threatens exces
sive judicial entanglement with the rulemaking process, in a way that
would likely have unfortunate systemic effects, in the form of a power
ful bias toward protecting the status quo. The best response to this
concern is to choose one of the two recent innovations in judicial re
view of administrative action: allowing the agency to issue an interim
rule, or (better still) remanding the regulations without vacating them.

1.

Failing the Hard Look

A quite standard opinion would have invalidated the agency's
rules on the ground that there was an insufficiently clear explanation
of the key policy decisions. On this view, the problem was not one of
delegation, but of a lack of clarity about why lines were drawn exactly
where EPA drew them. Why did EPA choose 0.08 ppm rather than
0.07 ppm, or 0.06 ppm? The difficulty of answering that question in
concrete terms would have justified a remand to the agency.
This approach might be generalized. It could apply, for example,
to a judgment of OSHA that a regulation is necessary to address a
"significant risk," or to an administrative decision to proceed against
an "unreasonable risk." In such cases, courts might require agencies
to quantify the problem that they are attempting to reduce, and ex
plain why they chose the approach at issue rather than one more or
less stringent. A simple requirement of this kind might strengthen the
hand of technocratic and policy-analytic forces in the regulatory state,

291. See supra Section V.B.
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thus weakening the hand of self-interested private groups; it might
also promote transparency about the relevant value judgments.

2.

Surviving a Softer Look

Another type of conventional opinion, more deferential to the
agency and also reasonable, might have upheld both the ozone and the
PM standards, on the ground that neither had been shown to be arbi
trary or capricious - the agency sufficiently explained why the risk
was less severe below the standard it set, and also why the risk was too
severe at any point above that standard. The agency did show that
significant risks could be expected, especially from particulates, where
thousands of people, on a reasonable view of the evidence, were at
risk each year. To be sure, significant challenges were made to the
science underlying both decisions. But the record contained substan
tial support for EPA's particular choices - at least enough support to
satisfy a court engaged in the ordinary scrutiny of EPA decisions.
This approach might also be generalized. For example, a court
might uphold OSHA action so long as the agency has explained why a
particular risk is significant and explained, at least in broad terms, why
it did not select a more or less stringent alternative.

3.

The Problem of Ossification and the Tyranny of the
Status Quo Revisited

Both of these opinions would have been entirely responsible, and
the choice between them, both for the case at hand and for future ap
proaches to judicial review, is not easy. Ultimately I conclude that the
first is preferable in the context of American Trucking. If the second
is to be preferred, it is not because EPA was doing its job well, but for
reasons that go to institutional competence and that involve the harm
ful systemic effects of the seemingly innocuous, one-shot remand.
With respect to institutional competence: EPA is of course ac
countable to the President, and environmental issues tend to be highly
visible and well ventilated publicly - as well ventilated, perhaps, as
any other issue of regulatory policy. Certainly the PM and ozone rules
were subject to a high degree of public scrutiny. At the same time,
these are technically complex questions on which EPA has a strong
comparative advantage over the judiciary. If there is a clear blunder,
or a judgment that does not depend on either a reasonable assessment
of the scientific evidence or (where the evidence leaves gaps) a rea
sonable and articulated judgment of value, of course the court should
interfere. But otherwise it should not.
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With respect to systematic effects: A great deal of attention has
been paid to the phenomenon of the "ossification" of notice-and
comment rulemaking,292 and indeed a high priority, for the future of
administrative law, is to devise means to overcome the problem.
Originally intended as a quick and effective alternative to formal, on
the-record rulemaking, executive and especially judicial innovations
have converted notice-and-comment rulemaking into an exceptionally
time-consuming affair, often consuming many years, frequently half a
decade and more. In fact EPA estimates that informal rulemaking
typically takes five years.293 Consider, for example, the fact that EPA's
only rulemaking under the Toxic Substances Control Act, involving
asbestos, cost millions of dollars and took over a decade to complete
- and that the rule that emerged was eventually struck down as in
adequately justified.294 Aggressive judicial review contributes to these
delays, and when the result is to remand a rule, the ultimate conse
quence can be to discourage rulemaking altogether. For example, the
impressive study of Mashaw and Harfst shows that the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") has come close to
abandoning rulemaking, largely because of the problems introduced
by "hard look" judicial review.295 Instead of rulemaking, NHTSA acts
largely through after-the-fact recalls, to which courts are far more
sympathetic. It is far from clear that American drivers are better off
with this shift. Nor is this an isolated example. Something similar ap
pears to have happened with the Consumer Product Safety Commis
sion, and EPA seems to have abandoned enforcement of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, largely as a result of intense judicial scrutiny
of EPA activity.296
Now we cannot conclude that a certain judicial role is inappropri
ate simply because it leads to agency inactivity. Perhaps it is good for
exactly that reason. The problem is when strict judicial supervision
has the effect of freezing the status quo, whatever the status quo hap
pens to be. This is an unintended systemic effect of hard look review.
Particular judges, reviewing particular rules, can be made alert to par
ticular problems in those rules, especially when the rules are under at
tack by experienced, inventive lawyers. For some rules, it is easy to
imagine seemingly decisive objections from both sides - as public in-

292. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Proc
ess, 41 DUKE LJ. 1385 (1992); MASHAw & HARFsT, supra note 207, at 224-54.
293. See CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT,
RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 108 (1993).
294. See Pierce, supra note 83, at 61.
295. See MASHAW & HARFsT, supra note 207, at 10-19.
296. See id. at 225; see also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 250, at 372-73; Pierce, supra
note 83, at 61.
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terest lawyers show, quite convincingly, why a certain rule should have
been made more stringent, and as industry lawyers show, with respect
to the same rule, why greater leniency was legally mandated. Nor is
this fanciful; something of this kind has happened on several occasions
in the "hard look" era.297
There is no simple cure for the problem, especially in light of evi
dence that hard look review has often accomplished considerable
good. But it makes sense to say that in the absence of a violation of a
statute, courts should not invalidate regulations unless the objection
goes to the heart of the agency's conclusions - unless there has been
a quite serious error of analysis, or there is good reason to think that
the rule will make things worse rather than better in light of statutorily
relevant criteria. Of course advice of this sort will not decide concrete
questions. But it suggests serious problems with the invalidation of
EPA's ozone and particulates regulations.

4.

Procedural Innovations: Administrative Law Minimalism

Thus far a court might seem to be in equipoise between two rea
sonable alternatives: a decision to uphold the regulations on the
grounds just stated, and a decision to invalidate them on the theory
that the agency offered no clear explanation of the particular level it
chose. The choice between the alternatives might turn on assessment
of the systemic effects of one or another course. The danger of invali
dation is that it could greatly delay this or any other EPA rulemaking,
in a way that would cause a powerful status quo bias, one that could
not be defended. The danger of validation is that it would allow EPA
rules that have not been persuasively defended and that might do less
good than harm.
But two recent procedural innovations help resolve the dilemma,
and point the way to a sensible resolution of the American Trucking
case. Courts of appeals now appear prepared to allow agencies to is
sue "interim rules" on remand,298 so as to ensure against the harm that
may come from returning to the prerule status quo; and courts are also
prepared, in appropriate circumstances, to remand rules without va
cating them.299 The "interim rules" approach makes best sense when

297. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 408-09
(1971) (finding approval of highway through park inadequately supported); Citizens to Pre
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 357 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (finding disapproval
of same highway inadequately supported), rev'd, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974).
298. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Checkosky
v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 462-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. FERC,
822F.2d 1123, 1130-32 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Pierce, supra note 83, at 73-75.
299. See Davis County Solid Waste Management v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1454, 1459-60 (D.C.
Cir. 1997}; Idaho Farm v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1995); AMA v. Reno, 57
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the agency can show that without such rules, people will face serious
risks of one kind or another; the "remand without vacating" approach
makes best sense when the agency may well be able to justify its action
on remand. Both of these ideas are designed to ensure that rules that
are highly likely to be reasonable are not struck from the books, in a
way that could produce serious problems. Properly understood, they
do not allow agencies to proceed with inadequately justified rules if it
appears unlikely that those rules could be lawfully explained, or if it
appears that little will be lost with invalidation.
Hence we arrive at an appropriate approach to these cases, one
with general application: The rules should be held unlawful, and re
manded to the agency; but they should not be vacated, at least when
the agency can show (a) that it may be able to generate a justification
that will satisfy judicial review, and (b) that invalidation of the rule
may generate significant risks (by, for example, allowing people to be
exposed to nontrivial dangers, or by preventing the agency from initi
ating a program for reducing such risks .300 After the agency attempts
to justify its regulation on remand, its decision may be appealed to the
court, which can evaluate the new justification and uphold or invali
date the regulation as appropriate. An approach of this kind seems
especially sensible for the particulates regulation, which is designed to
counteract what, on a reasonable reading of the evidence, count as
quite serious risks to life and health. The problem with invalidation is
that it would prevent the agency from beginning implementation and
require the agency to start largely from scratch, a process that may re
quire years or more of rulemaking activity. A remand without invali
dation would allow the agency to proceed if (as appears quite possi
ble) the regulation can be adequately defended by reference to the
criteria I have outlined. Things are more difficult for ozone, because
the risks are far lower, and because nonregulation may actually pro
duce health benefits;301 but here as well, a remand without invalidation
would probably be the best way to proceed.
It would be possible to object that the technique of "remand with
out invalidation" creates unfortunate incentives for administrators,
above all because it permits the continued legality and even the en-

)

F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 28 F.3d at 1268; Checkosky, 23 F.3d
at 462-65; Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (announcing that
court will not vacate rules because of inadequacy in agency reasoning if agency has a serious
possibility of correcting the deficiency on remand and vacation may be disruptive); Mid-Tex
Elec. Coop., 822 F.2d at 1132-34.
300. Some support for BPA's choices here, though to be sure not decisive, comes from
the fact that California made quite similar decisions not less than a decade ago. See James
M. Lents, A Review ofNational Ozone and Particulate Matter Air Quality Standards In Light
ofLong-Standing California Air Quality Standards, 11 TUI.. ENVTL. L.J. 415, 421-23 (1998).
301. See infra Section VI.A.5.
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forcement of rules that have been found to be inadequately justified
(and that may not ultimately survive review). The enforcement of
these rules may cost millions and even billions of dollars. If so, isn't
invalidation preferable? To be sure, a system in which inadequately
justified rules are invalidated would create more pressure to produce
adequate justifications in the first instance. But the proper response
to this concern is not to invalidate all inadequately justified rules, but
to restrict the "remand without invalidation" technique to special cir
cumstances, above all (a) to rules that might well tum out to be valid
(b) in conditions in which invalidation would produce serious prob
lems for the legitimate policies that underlie the rules in question. The
court of appeals for the D.C. Circuit has made considerable progress
in drawing the necessary lines.302
There is a broader point in the background here. The techniques
of remand without invalidation, and of allowing interim rules, can be
seen as a form of administrative law "minimalism," akin to judicial
minimalism in constitutional law generally.303 Such techniques do no
more than is necessary to resolve a case. Indeed, these forms of mini
malism are democracy-reinforcing insofar as they attempt to ensure
that agency decisions are based on grounds that are both transparent
to the public and sufficient to justify the regulation in light of statutory
criteria.

5.

A Health-Health Wrinkle

A difficult question, not addressed thus far, is raised by a particular
claim with respect to EPA's ozone regulation: that ground-level
ozone has health benefits, and that these benefits were not taken into
account by the agency. There is evidence that ozone reduces the risk
of both cataracts and cancers.304 If taken into account, the health
benefits of ozone at current levels may well be roughly equivalent to
the health costs. But EPA refused to consider those health benefits.
In an interesting application of "health-health" analysis, the court of
appeals held that the refusal was unlawful.305
In general, it is right to say that agencies should be required to take
account of the health problems sometimes produced by regulation de-

302 See Davis County, 108 F.3d at 1457; AMA, 57 F.3d at 1135; Allied Signal, 988 F.2d
at 150-51 (announcing that a court will not vacate rules because of inadequacy in agency rea
soning if agency has a serious possibility of correcting the deficiency on remand and vacation
may be disruptive).
303. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 3-72.
304. See Lutter & DeMuth, supra note 8, at 10.
305. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051-52 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(per curiam).
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signed to reduce health problems. This kind of health-health tradeoff
can take many different forms.306 In typical cases, the regulation of
one risk, like that associated with asbestos, may give rise to further
risks as a result of the substituted products. The most adventurous
claims for "health-health" comparisons arise when a costly regulation
imposes health risks simply by virtue of its cost.307 If a regulation pro
duces less employment and more poverty, it may result in worse
health as well. But these are adventurous claims, because they depend
on contentious projections about the disemployment effects of par
ticular regulations.
For the ozone rule, the argument for taking health-health tradeoffs
into account seemed especially insistent, for the claim was far from in
direct, and there was nothing speculative or abstruse about the causal
chain. If ozone protects against cancers and cataracts, it is possible
that a regulation of ozone will cause serious health problems. The text
of the Act is quite ambiguous on the point, and the court was wrong to
say that it unambiguously required the agency to address the benefi
cial effects of air pollutants.308 But the court was right to hold that
even if it was ambiguous, the agency interpretation was unreasonable.
The rule was properly found inadequately justified on this ground, and
it may well be that after remand, the agency will be unable to explain
any failure to take account of the effects of ozone in combating cata
racts and cancer.

6.

A Final Contrast

There is of course a commonality between the approach taken by
the American Trucking court and the approach I am suggesting.
Where the American Trucking court said that the ambient air quality
standards provisions of the Clean Air Act are unconstitutional unless
EPA imposes limits on its own discretion, I have argued that ambient
air quality standards are valid if, and only if, EPA is able to generate a
"benefits analysis" that operates to constrain EPA discretion and to
promote interregulation consistency. The goals of the two approaches
are quite close. The disadvantage of the American Trucking approach
is that it involves unnecessary, even reckless, use of the Constitution
- and does so in a way that threatens to raise too many questions
about too many statutes. By contrast, the approach I have suggested
has firm roots in the APA and in existing doctrine, and promises to

306. See JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATIIAN B. WIENER, RISK VS. RISK 247-68 (1995);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, Health-Health Tradeoffs, in FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 298,
298-317 (1997).
307. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 306, at 298-317.
308. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1051-52.

Michigan Law Review

376

(Vol. 98:303

improve regulatory practice without calling for an excessive judicial
role.
C.

Congress: Safety and Its Cost

Should Congress amend the national ambient air quality provisions
of the Clean Air Act? This is not the place for an extended discussion
of that question; but the analysis thus far suggests three possibilities.
1.

How Safe Is Safe Enough?

As emphasized throughout, a crucial defect of the national ambi
ent air quality provisions is that they seem to assume that whether air
is "safe" can be assessed solely on the basis of the facts. The truth is
that the facts might be able to show the degree of risk (at least within a
range), but they cannot show whether any particular degree of safety
is "safe enough." Whether or not pollutants lack safe thresholds, "the
paradigm of selecting a standard at the lowest-observable-effects-level
and then providing an 'adequate margin of safety' is not possible. "309
The result of the statutory framework is to misframe the key question
and also to give EPA little guidance for answering and asking that
question. As we have seen, EPA has greatly struggled with the re
sulting difficulties.
Congress should amend the statute to identify the factors for EPA
to consider in making the judgment about appropriate national stan
dards. Congress might offer substantive guidance by saying, for ex
ample, that EPA must consider risk severity, size of affected popula
tion, and likelihood of adverse effects at various exposure levels. On
the procedural side, it might require EPA to identify, to the extent
possible, the nature of the risks that it is reducing, and at the same
time to attempt to quantify the relevant risk reductions. The strongest
argument against an amendment to this effect is that it is unnecessary;
if EPA moved in the directions suggested above, it would essentially
be interpreting the current statute as if it contained instructions of ex
actly this sort. But an amendment of this kind would at least provide a
clear legislative signal, and move EPA judgments in the direction of
greater transparency.

309. See EPA's Rulemakings on the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Par·
ticulate Matter and Ozone: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law
ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 {1997) (prepared statement of George
T. Woolf, Former Chairman, EPA's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee).

November 1999]

Nondelegation and EPA
2.

377

More Flexible Tools

We now know that significant cost savings can be achieved by us
ing more flexible, market-oriented instruments, such as tradable pollu
tion permits rather than uniform national requirements.310 Sometimes,
however, EPA does not choose such instruments even when it is le
gally authorized to do so.311 It would make sense to amend the statute
to require EPA, wherever feasible, to use economic incentives rather
than a "command-and-control" approach.312
It is clear that an approach of this kind could save substantial re
sources, and if the instruments are properly chosen, it should do so
without at the same time compromising air quality goals.313 An effort
to encourage EPA to select less burdensome alternatives could send a
desirable signal to attempt the least-cost methods of obtaining regula
tory goals, and might in addition spur creative experimentation.

3.

Costs and Benefits

A possible lesson of EPA experience with national standards is
that EPA should be required or at least permitted to consider costs
when setting such standards. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that the
statute should be construed to forbid cost-benefit analysis from
EPA,314 though lower courts have unanimously concluded otherwise.315
If the Supreme Court does not reject the lower courts' view, it is worth
giving serious consideration to a statutory change.
The basic reasoning here is straightforward. If a reduction from
0.08 to 0.07 would be a trivial expense, surely it should be required; if

310. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THE
ENVIRONMENT GOES TO MARKET (1994). See also supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
311. See Gray, supra note 14, at 235-36.
312 Cf. Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Governmental Af
fairs, 104th Cong. 194 (1995) (statement of Jonathan B. Wiener) (urging general amendment
to allow agencies to choose incentive-based regulation).
313. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons
for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989).
314. After Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), ambiguities in the statute are to be resolved by the agency, and there is a good
argument that the key provision of the Act is ambiguous. Recall that the statute requires
standards to be set at a level "requisite to protect the public health," and it is not unreason
able to say that that level is at least partly a function of the costs of the regulation. What
level is "requisite" may well depend on the costs as well as benefits of getting there. Ironi
cally, however, the view that the agency can choose, or fail to choose, cost-benefit analysis
seems to aggravate rather than to diminish the old nondelegation doctrine, even though an
agency choice of that kind would seem to satisfy the new nondelegation doctrine. See Indus
trial Union v. OSHA, 37 F3d 665, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding that the nondelega
tion problem would be eliminated if OSHA chose cost-benefit analysis).
315. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text
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it would cost billions of dollars, there had better be good grounds to
believe very substantial health benefits would follow. A possible ar
gument to the contrary is that national standards operate as aspira
tions, not ordinary law, and aspirations, at least, should be set on a
health-only basis - not because there is a magic place where air qual
ity is "safe," but because it is valuable to obtain, and use, a techno
cratic judgment that people should have air quality of a certain speci
fied sort.316 The problem is that it is impossible to assess "safety" in a
cost vacuum. In general, cost-benefit analysis should be followed, ac
knowledging that it will raise some hard questions of value.317
The best argument against an amendment to require cost-benefit
analysis is that the statute, complex as it is, actually embodies a better
accommodation of costs and benefits than would a statute that re
quired ',cost-benefit analysis at the level of standard-setting.318 On this
view, the optimal system is one in which EPA makes an initial, purely
health-based judgment, and then the process of implementation allows
costs to play a role at various stages, emphatically including an expec
tation that implementation will not be immediate and will in fact be a
produet of a continuing inquiry into whether compliance is worth
while,
things considered.319 A possible virtue of this state of affairs
is precisely the aspirational quality of the health-based standard, set
ting a target against which various state performances can be meas
ured. The aspirational quality can also contribute to technology-

f11

316. See the quotation from Administrator Browner, supra text accompanying note 50.
Administrator Browner goes on to say:
While cost-benefit analysis is a tool that can be helpful in developing strategies to implement
our nation's air quality standards, we believe it is inappropriate for use to set the standards
themselves. In many cases, cost-benefit analysis has overstated costs. In addition, many
kinds of benefits are virtually impossible to quantify - how do I put a dollar value on reduc
tions in a child's lung function or the premature aging of lungs or increased susceptibility to
respiratory infection?

Clean Air Hearings, supra note 50, at 282 (statement of Carol M. Brovmer, Administrator,
EPA). Ironically, the Regulatory Impact Analysis required by President Clinton engages in
monetization of just this kind. See generally infra app.
317. See Sunstein, supra note 274. A good treatment of some of the questions of value
can be found in recent testimony of Richard Revesz. See Clean Air Act Authorizations:

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety,
106th Cong. (1999) {Testimony of Richard L. Revesz), available in LEXIS.COM, Legislation
& Politics Library, U.S. Congress Folder, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional
Testimony File.

318. This seems to be the conclusion of William F. Pedersen, Science and Public Policy:
A Case Study of the Clean Air Act, 16 PACEENVT'L L. REv. 15 (1998). Pedersen argues that
a purely health-based standard can force technological innovation, see id. at 23-24, and also
stimulate and focus public debate, see id. at 22-23; he ends with the interesting suggestion
that EPA should be required to set standards "tight enough to protect against all clearly
demonstrated health or welfare effects," but that EPA should be allowed to consider costs
and technical feasibility in choosing the "margin of safety," id. at 30.

319. See Farber, supra note 11, at 315-18, for an illuntinating discussion of this point.
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forcing, an important and often highly desirable phenomenon in envi
ronmental protection,320 and a phenomenon to which cost-benefit
analysis is, at least in practice,321 unlikely to contribute.
In the abstract, it is hard to know whether this pragmatic argument
is valid.322 What is clear is that the statutory scheme, pragmatically de
fensible as it may be, is far from transparent, and provides a set of con
fusing signals to the American public.
CONCLUSION

Whenever an agency issues a regulation designed to diminish risks
to health, safety, or the environment, it should attempt to identify the
gains sought by the particular regulation it has chosen, and it should
compare these gains to those under at least two reasonable alternative
regimes, one stricter and one more lenient. In this light, the most seri
ous problem with EPA's performance in issuing national air quality
standards is that it usually fails to explain, in simple, concise terms, its
decision to require a particular level of ambient air quality. Some
times EPA acts as if it were pursuing "safety" and ensuring "safe lev
els," without sufficiently acknowledging that for most pollutants, the
serious question is what degree of safety. To its credit, EPA invaria
bly offers extensive discussions of the underlying data, demonstrating
that there is a genuine health risk at current levels. But to the extent
that it provides an explanation of its particular choices, the discussion
often involves little more than evidence of nontrivial adverse effects at
those current levels - evidence that may well argue for a reduction
from current levels, but does not by itself call for any particular regula
tory standard.
In this Article, I have argued that EPA (and other agencies in
volved in similar tasks) should offer a detailed "benefits analysis."
The central goal of this approach would be to create a kind of federal
common law of environmental protection, generated in the first in320. Technology-forcing is not desirable if the costs of the forcing exceed the benefits
for example, the new technology contributes little to air quality, but substantially in
creases prices and diminishes wages.

if,

-

321. In principle, a competent cost-benefit analysis would include the costs (and bene
fits) of new technological developments, and indeed this issue is discussed in the particulates
and ozone regulatory impact analysis. See RIA, supra note 70, ch. 11. The problem is that
government is likely to have very little information about the cost of technological innova
tion, and industry is likely to overstate those costs by a significant amount. See W. KIP
VISCUS!, FATAL TRADEOFFS 161-80 (1993) (discussing substantial overstatement of compli
ance costs).
322. See the valuable article by James E. Krier, On the Topology ofNational Standards
in a Federal System -And Why It Matters, 54 Mn. L. REV. 1226 (1995), a staunch and long
time defender of cost-benefit analysis for the Clean Air Act, who acknowledges the prag
matic possibility.
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stance by administrative agencies, and designed to promote consis
tency and rationality in the protection of health and safety. I have also
defended a form of democracy-promoting minimalism for administra
tive law - the particular form of minimalism that is embodied in the
remand, often (and increasingly) unaccompanied by invalidation.
The Clean Air Act should not be held unconstitutional, and BPA
should not be required, on pain of constitutional invalidation, to come
up with a "generic unit of harm" to encompass population affected,
severity, and probability. The new nondelegation doctrine is a large
mistake. On the other hand, ordinary judicial review should require
any national ambient air quality standard to be accompanied by an
adequate explanation of why that level, rather than one more or less
stringent, has been selected. By itself, this requirement calls (to the
extent feasible) for a high degree of quantification from BPA; it also
bears on the performance of other regulatory agencies entrusted with
the task of protecting health, safety, and the environment. It calls for
invalidation, and not merely remand, where the agency is unable to
offer an explanation of its choice of one level of regulation rather than
another. A requirement of this kind would mark a key moment in the
shift from the rigidity and simplicity of 1970s environmentalism to
ward a new and more promising approach - one that places a high
premium on assessing the magnitude of problems, ensuring consis
tency across regulations, limiting interest-group power, acquiring bet
ter information, and authorizing democratic control of regulatory
choices.
My principal claim here is that both courts and EPA should con
strue the Act so as to prevent regulation of small risks and so as to re
quire regulation of substantial risks - and BPA should explain, as
quantitatively as possible, what must be shown in order for a risk to
qualify, or not to qualify, as substantial. It is excessive, a form of
rhetoric, to say that on BPA's view, it is entitled to choose any level
between zero risk and a level slightly below "London's Killer Fog."
But it is not a form of rhetoric to think that if BPA has not limited its
own discretion by speaking in less conclusory terms, the Clean Air Act
raises problems for both regulatory policy and democratic self
government. The ultimate goal of the forms of the democracy
promoting minimalism that I have endorsed here would be to ensure
better policy analysis and greater transparency of decision, in a way
that should simultaneously promote democratic, economic, and air
quality goals.
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APPENDIX

1. Particulate Matter:
PM 2.5:

a. July 18, 1997: EPA sets a public health standard for fine
particle pollution. 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (1997).
Total Suspended Particulates and PM 10:
a. April 28, 1971: EPA promulgates the primary and secon
dary standards for particulate matter. Primary: 75 micro
grams per cubic meter - annual geometric mean; 260
µg/m3, 24-hour average not to be exceeded more than once
per year. Secondary: 150µg/m3 maximum 24-hour concen
tration not to be exceeded more than once per year; 60
µg/m3 annual geometric mean. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187
(1971).
b. July 1, 1987: EPA changes the indicator for PM from total
suspended particles to PMw 24-hour PM10 of 150 µg/m3
with no more than one expected exceedance per year; an
nual PM10 standard of 50 µg/m3 expected annual arithmetic
mean; secondary standards identical to primary standards.
52 Fed. Reg. 24,634 (1987).
c. July 18, 1997: EPA promulgates regulation which is later
struck down by D.C. Circuit. Two new P� standards
added, set at 15 µg/m3 and 65 µg/m3• 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,652.
2. Ozone:

a. April 30, 1971: EPA promul�ates first NAAQS for photo
chemical oxidants. 160 µg/m ; 0.08 ppm maximum 1-hour
concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year.
36 Fed. Reg. at 8187.
b. April 20, 1977: EPA reviews and updates criteria docu
ment. 42 Fed. Reg. 20,493 (1977).
c. February 8, 1979: EPA revises primary standard to 0.12
ppm and sets secondary standard identical to primary. 44
Fed. Reg. 8202 (1979).
d. March 9, 1993: EPA reviews air quality standards and de
cides not to revise standards. 58 Fed. Reg. 13,008 (1993).
e. February 3, 1994: EPA announces it will review standards.
59 Fed. Reg. 5164 (1994).
f. July 18, 1997: EPA promulgates new standards which are
later struck down by the D.C. Circuit Court. Primary: 8hour standard at a level of 0.08 ppm. Secondary: identical
0.08 ppm standard. 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997).
(A more complete history of ozone is presented in Section II.B of the
U.S. EPA OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS,
REVIEW OF NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
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OZONE: ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION
(1996).)
3. Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Dioxides):

a. April 30, 1971: EPA promulgates primary and secondary
NAAQS for sulfur oxides. Primary: 80 µg/m3, 0.03 ppm an
nual arithmetic mean; 365 µg/m3; 0.14 ppm maximum 24hour concentration not to be exceeded more than once per
year. Secondary: 1300 µg/m3; 0.5 ppm maximum 3-hour
concentration not to be exceeded more than once per ¥ear;
60 µg/m3; 0.02 ppm annual arithmetic mean; 260 µg/m ; 0.1
ppm maximum 24-hour concentration not to be exceeded
more than once per year. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187 (1971).
b. April 26, 1988: EPA decides not to revise the existing pri
mary and secondary standards. 53 Fed. Reg. 14,926 (1988).
c. April 21, 1993: EPA decides not to revise the existing sec
ondary standards. 58 Fed. Reg. 21,351 (1993).
d. November 15, 1994: EPA publishes a second proposal re
garding revision of primary standards for sulfur oxides. 59
Fed. Reg. 58,958 (1994).
e. May 22, 1996: EPA reviews and revises the air quality cri
teria upon which the existing national ambient air quality
standards ("NAAQS") for sulfur oxides are based. Based
on that review, EPA decides that revisions of the NAAQS
for sulfur oxides are not appropriate at this time, aside from
several minor technical changes. 61 Fed. Reg. 25,566
(1996).

4. Nitrogen Oxides:

a. April 30, 1971: EPA issues identical primary and secondary
standards for N02 set at 0.05 ppm (100 µg/m3) annual
arithmetic average. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187 (1971).
b. December 12, 1978: EPA announces the first review and
update. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,1117 (1978).
c. June 19, 1985: EPA decides to retain the same standard.
50 Fed. Reg. 25,532 (1985).
d. April 26, 1988: EPA publishes a second proposal regarding
revision of primary standards. 53 Fed. Reg. 14,926 (1988).
e. October 11, 1995: EPA proposes to retain national stan
dards for nitrogen dioxide. 60 Fed. Reg. 52, 874, 52,875
(1995).
f. October 8, 1996: EPA issues its final decision retaining
standard for nitrogen dioxide. 61 Fed. Reg. 52,852 (1996).

5. Carbon Monoxide:

a. April 30, 1971: EPA promulgates the initial standard for
carbon monoxide at the level of 10 µg/m3, 9 ppm maximum
8-hour concentration not to be exceeded more than once
per year; 40 µg/m3, 35 ppm maximum 1-hour concentration
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not to be exceeded more than once per year. 36 Fed. Reg.
8186, 8187 (1971).
b. September 13, 1985: EPA retains the primary standard and
revokes the secondary standard. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,484
(1985).
c. August 1, 1994: EPA announces its decision to retain the
current primary standard for carbon monoxide. There is no
secondary standard for carbon monoxide. 59 Fed. Reg.
38,906, 38909-11 (1994).
6. Lead:

a. October 5, 1978: EPA promulgates standards for lead at
the level of 1.5 µg Pb/m3• 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246 (1978).
b. November 5, 1997: EPA publishes final rule for lead, 62
Fed. Reg. 59,813, 59,813-14 (1997), but withdraws it on Dec.
23, 1997, due to adverse comments, 62 Fed. Reg. at 67,009.
c. January 20, 1999: EPA issues final rule. 64 Fed. Reg. 3030,
3030-31 (1999).
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(Note: The following tables are taken verbatim from the EPA's
Regulatory Impact Analysis, as noted in the text.)
TABLE 2: PROPOSED P11i0 STANDARD (50/150 µG/M3 ) 99TH
PERCENTILE NATIONAL ANNuAL HEALTH
INCIDENCE REDUCTIONS323

Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS
(year = 2010)
Partial Attainment Scenario
ENDPOJNT324

Annual P� (µg/m)

50

Daily P� (µg/m)

150

*L Mortality325: short-term exposure

long-term e:xposure
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. Congestive heart failure
*5. Ischemic heart disease
*6. Acute Bronchitis
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks
*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days ("MRADs")

360
340
6,800
190
470
170
140
130
140
1,100
10,400
5,300
18,300
8,800
106,000
879,000

323. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-45, tbl.12.6. Numbers may not completely agree due to
rounding.
324. Only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates.
325. Mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long
term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues.
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TABLE 3: OZONE : NATIONAL ANNUAL HEALTH
INCIDENCE R.EDUCTIONS326

Estimates are incremental to the current ozone NAAQS (year = 2010)

ENDPOINT327
Ozone Health:
*1. Mortality
Hospital Admissions

*2. all respiratory (all ages)
all respiratory (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
emer. Dept. visits for asthma

*3. Acute Respiratory Symptoms
(any of 19)
asthma attacks
MRADs

*4. Mortality from air toxics
Ancillary PM Health:
*1. Mortality328: short-term exposure
Ion�·term exposure
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. congestive heart failure
*5. ischemic heart disease

*6. Acute Bronchitis

Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 5th
0.08 3rd
0.08 4th Max
Max
Max
Low- to High·
High-end
High-end
end Est.
Est.
Est.
80

0 - 80

120

280
2,300
860
260
120
28,510

300 - 300
2,330 - 2,330
870 - 870
260 - 260
130 - 130
29,840 - 29,840

420
1,570
600
200
180
42,070

60
620
1

60 - 60
650 - 650
1-1

90
920
2

60
180
400

0 - 80
0 - 250
0 - 530

110
340
690

70
50
20
10
10
10
290

0 - 90
0 - 60
0 - 20
0 - 20
0 - 20
0 - 20
0 - 400

120
80
30
20
20
20
530

326. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-47, tbl.12.8. Numbers may not completely agree due to
rounding.
327. Only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates.
328. PM mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or
long-term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues.
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ENDPOINT327
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks

*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days
("MRADs")

Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 3rd
0.08 5th
0.08 4th Max
Max
Max
Low- to HighHigh-end
High-end
end Est.
Est.
Est.
3,510
320
800
4,210
38,700

0 - 4,670
0 - 430
0 - 1,220
0 - 5,510
0 - 50,440

6,190
570
1,660
7,200
66,160

322,460

0 - 420,300

551,300
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TABLE 4: WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY ESTIMATES (MEAN YALUES)

Health Endpoint
Mortality
Life saved
Life year extended
Hospital Admissions:
All Respiratory Illnesses, all ages
Pneumonia, age ;:: 65
COPD, age ;:: 65
Iscbemic Heart Disease, age ;:: 65
Congestive Heart Failure, age ;:: 65
Emergency Visits for Asthma
Chronic Bronchitis
Upper Respiratory Symptoms
Lower Respiratory Symptoms
Acute Bronchitis
Acute Respiratory Symptoms (any of 19)
Asthma
Shortness of Breath
Sinusitis and Hay Fever
Work Loss Days
Restricted Activity Days ("RAD")
Minor RAD
Respiratory RAD
Worker Productivity
Visibility: residential
recreational
Household Soiling Damage

Mean WTP Value per Incident
(1990 $)
$4.8 million
$120,000
$12,700
$13,400
$15,900
$ 20,600
$ 16,600
$9,000
$260,000
$19
$12
$45
$18
$32
$5.30
not monetized

$83
$38
not monetized
$1 per worker per 10% change in ozone
$14 per unit decrease in deciview per
household
Range of $7.30 to $11 per unit decrease
in deciview per household
(see U.S. EPA, 1997a)

$2.50 per household per µg/m3

*See the Benefits TSD for citations (U.S. EPA, 1997a).

329.

RIA, supra note 70, at 12-41, tbl.123.
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TABLE 5: PROPOSED PMi0 STANDARD (50/150 µG/M3 ) 99TH
PERCENTILE NATIONAL ANNUAL MONETIZED HEALTH BENEFITS
INCIDENCE REDUCTIONS330
Estimates are incremental to the current ozone (0.12 ppm, 1-hr.)
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010)

Partial Attainment Scenario
High-end Est.
ENDPOINT331

Annual P� (µglm3)

50

Daily P� (µglm3)

150

*L Mortality332: short-term exposure
Ion2-term exposure
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. congestive heart failure
*5. ischemic heart disease

*6. Acute Bronchitis
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks

*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days ("MRADs")
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS
using long-term mortality
using short-term mortality

$1.7
$1.6
$1.8
$0.002
$0.006
$0.003
$0.002
$0.002
$0.003
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0.009
$0.034
$3.4
$3.5

330. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-46, tbl.12.7. Numbers may not completely agree due to
rounding.
331. Only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates.
332. Mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long
term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues.
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TABLE 6: OZONE : NATIONAL ANNuAL MONETIZED HEALTH
BENEFITS ESTIMATES333

Estimates are incremental to the current ozone NAAQS
(0.12 ppm, 1-hour)
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010)

ENDPOINT334
Ozone Health:
*L Mortality
Hospital Admissions

*2. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
emer. dept. visits for asthma

t.•3. Acute Respiratory Symptoms
(any of 19)
asthma attacks
MRADs

*4. Mortality from air toxics
Ancillary PM Health:
*L Mortality335: short-term exposure
long-term exposure
�·2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. congestive heart failure
*5. ischemic heart disease

*6. Acute Bronchitis
*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms

Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 5th
0.08 3rd
0.08 4th Max
Max
Max
Low- to ffigh·
ffigh·end
ffigh-end
end Est. .
Est.
Est.
$0.370

$0.000 - $0.380

$0.570

$0.004
$0.029
$0.014
$0.004
$0.001
$0.001

$0.004 - $0.004
$0.029 - $0.029
$0.014 - $0.014
$0.004 - $0.004
$0.001 - $0.001
$0.001 - $0.001

$0.006
$0
$0.010
$0.003
$0.002
$0.001

$0
$0
$0.003

$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0.006- $0.006

$0
$0
$0.011

$0.300
$0.870
$0.110

$0 - $0.400
$0 - $1.210
$0 - $0.140

$0.520
$1.640
$0.180

$0.001
$0.001
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

$0 - $0.001
$0 - $0.001
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0

$0.001
$0.001
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

333. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-48, tbl.12.9. Numbers may not completely agree due to
rounding.
334. Only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estimates.
335. PM mortality estimates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or
long-term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues.
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ENDPOINr334

Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 5th
0.08 3rd
0.08 4th Max
Max
Max
Low- to HighHigh-end
High-end
end Est.
Est.
Est.

*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks

*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days
("MRADs")
TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS
using short-term PM mortality
using long-term PM mortality

$0
$0
$0
$0.003

$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0
$0 - $0.004

$0
$0
$0
$0.005

$0.012

$0 - $0.016

$0.020

$0.790
$1.400

$0.056
$1.785

$1.300
$2.400

TABLE ?: PM: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL .ANNuA LMONETIZED
HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFITS336

Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010)
Partial Attainment Scenario

Annual PM..s (pglm)

16

Low- to
High-end
Est.
15

Daily PM..s (pglm)

65

65

50

$83
$7.5
$90

$15 to $96
$4.3 to $8.1
$19 to $104

$99
$9
$107

High-end
Est.
Category
Health Benefits
Welfare Benefits

TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS

336. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-69, tbl.12.17.
rounding.

High-end
Est.
15

Numbers may not completely agree due to
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TABLE 8: PM: SELECTED PM10 STANDARD (50/150 µG/M3 - 99TH
PERCENTILE) SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ANNUAL MONETIZED
HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFITS337

Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010)
Partial Attainment Scenario
High-end Est.
Category

Annual P�0 (µg/m3)

50

Daily P� (µg/m)

150
$3.4 to $3.5
$1.6
$5.1 to $5.2

Health Benefits
Welfare Benefits

TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS

TABLE 9: OZONE: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ANNUAL MONETIZED
HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFITS338

Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS
(billions of 1990 $; year = 2010)
Partial Attainment Scenario
0.08 5th
0.08 4th max
0.08 3rd max
max HighLow- to HighHigh-end
end Est.
Est.
end Est.

Category
Health Benefits
Welfare Benefits

TOTAL MONETIZED BENEFITS

337. RIA
rounding.
338. RIA
rounding.

,

,

$1.4
$0.25
$1.6

$0.06 to $1.76
$0.32 to $0.32
. $0.4 to $2.1

$2.4
$0.5
$2.9

supra note 70,

at 12-69, tbl.12.18. Numbers may not completely agree due to

supra note 70,

at 12-70, tbl.12.19. Numbers may not completely agree due to
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TABLE 10: PROPOSED PM10 STANDARD (50/150

µG/M3 ) 99TH

PERCENTILE NATIONAL ANNuAL HEALTH
INCIDENCE REDUCTIONS339

Estimates are incremental to the current ozone and PM NAAQS:
year = 2010)

(

Partial Attainment Scenario
Annual P� (µglm)
Daily P� (µglm)
ENDPOINI.'34°
*L Mortality341: short-term exposure
lon�-term exuosure
*2. Chronic Bronchitis
Hospital Admissions:
*3. all respiratory (all ages)
all resp. (ages 65+)
pneumonia (ages 65+)
COPD (ages 65+)
*4. congestive heart failure
*5. ischemic heart disease
*6. Acute Bronchitis

*7. Lower Respiratory Symptoms
*8. Upper Respiratory Symptoms
shortness of breath
asthma attacks
*9. Work Loss Days
*10. Minor Restricted Activity Days ("MRADs")

50
150
360
340
6,800
190
470
170
140
130
140
1,100
10,400
5,300
18,300
8,800
106,000
879,000

339. RIA, supra note 70, at 12-45, tbl.12.6. Numbers may not completely agree due to
rounding.
340. Only endpoints denoted with an * are aggregated into total benefits estinlates.
341. Mortality estinlates must be aggregated using either short-term exposure or long
term exposure but not both, due to double-counting issues.
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TABLE 11: COMPARISON OF ANNuAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PM
ALTERNATIVES IN 2010 (1990 $)342
PM:.s
Alternative
(µg/m)

Annual Bene·
fits of Partial
Attainment343
(billion $)
(A)

Annual Costs
of
Partial At·
tainment
(billion $)
(B)

Net Benefits
of
Partial At·
tainment
(billion $)
(A - B)

Number of Residual Nonat·
tainment
Counties

16/65
(high-end estimate)

90

5.5

85

19

15/65
(low-end estimate)
(high-end estimate)

19 - 104

8.6

10 - 95

30

15/50
(high-end estimate)

108

9.4

98

41

342. RIA, supra note 70, at 13-3, tbl.13.1. All estimates are measured incremental to
partial attainment of the current PM,0 standard (PM,0 50/150, 1 expected exceedance per
year). The results for 16/65 and 15/50 are only for the high-end assumptions ranges. The
low-end estimates were not calculated for these alternatives.
343. Partial attainment benefits based upon post-control air quality as defined in the
control cost analysis.
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TABLE 12: COMPARISON OF A.NNuAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
OZONE ALTERNATIVES IN 2010

Ozone
Alternative
(ppm)

0.08 5th Max
(high-end estimate)

Annual Benefits of Partial
Attainmenf45
(billion $)
(A)

Annual Costs
of
Partial Attainment
(billion $)

(1990 $)344

Number of Residual Nonattainmcnt Areas

(B)

Net Benefits
of
Partial Attainment
(billion $)
(A - B)

1.6

0.9

0.7

12

0.4 - 2.1

1.1

0.7 - 1.0

17

2.9

1.4

1.5

27

0.08 4th Max
(low-end estimate)
(high-end estimate)

0.08 3rd Max
(high-end estimate)

344. RIA, supra note 70, at 13-4, tbl.13.2 All estimates are measured incremental to
partial attainment of the current ozone standard (0.12 ppm, 1 expected exceedance per
year). The results for 0.08, 5th max., and 0.08, 3rd max., are only for the high-end assump
tions. The low-end estimates were not calculated for these alternatives.
345. Partial attainment benefits based upon post-control air quality as defined in the
control cost analysis.

